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PREFACE
>
The prime frustration which one experiences in attempting to deal with an
isolated weak in the history of appeasement is the knowledge that it cannot be
treat*A as a separate entity. Actually,Munich is the final major link in a chain of
interrelated events oecuring in the 1930 'si the response (or lack of) to Japanese
aggression in Ethiopia* to German reoccupation of the Rhineland, and Austrian
Anschluss . The Munich week itself is important in that it is the culmination of
these events and in that it provides considerable insight into the thinking
and circumstances which fostered such a policy.
It also serves to provide some insight into events of recent years which smack of
some degree of tna same thing: our China policy between 1%6 and 1949, the manner
in which we conducted the Korean War, our methods in dealing with Communist
infiltration and aggression in Southeast Asia, our reaction to the Sukarno action
in Indonesia, and our hesitant Cuban policy.
In the following analysis I have endeavored to understand xhy Neville Cham-
berlain chose to follow his policy to the very end, in spite of the obvious
dangers, and to evaluate this decision in light of the possible alternatives.
I have given considerable attention to available documents of the era, includ-
ing British, German, Italian, and some Russian foreign policy papers; memoirs}
and British newspaper* and periodicals, including many letters to ths editors,
speeches, and published policy platforms of various organisations. At the same time
I have lent consideration to subjsctive interpretations by a wide range of histor-
ians of divergent points of view ranging from JJtf. Mheeler-Banoett to A .J .P. Taylor.
My focal point is Chamberlain's d ecision to act as he did from September 22 to
the 30th and the fallacy of his personal inflexibility! there were a msaber of moves
which he might have made but did not.
Some twenty-three hundred years ago Thuevdidea wrote that history should
provide lessons for future statesmen. The historian understands that,
philos-
ophically speaking past, present, and future are inseparable that the
present
should always be seen in light of the past and with an eye to the
future.
Whether our generation has learned Munich's lesson seeras highly
questionable.
We can hope, although not necessarily expect, that our immediate successors
will do so.
I. The Background
In seeking peace and dealing with the threat of Nazi Germany, British
Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain had a choice of perhaps four courses which
he might have followedi (1) collective security within the framework of the
league of Nations, (2) an alliance of anti-Axis powers outside the League,
(3) appeasement, and (4) a blend of (2) and (3), He chose appeasement, and
Ms determination to make it work persisted until 1939.
John W. Wheeler-Bennett cites two fundamental roots to the Chamberlain
brand of appeasement i (1) lack of preparation for war and (2; a conviction
that revision of the Treaty of Versailles would provide a solution to a
1
lasting peace. There wait other less important factors which had some bearing
on his thinking and policy-making. Included were a fear of war and what he
tiiought was its futility as a means of settling international disputes (Cham-
berlain had a genuine thtrst for peace) j a belief that the word of Adolf Hitler
could be trusted; a refusal to believe that frermany really wanted war or that
she would chance itj and, as Raymond Steams puts it, "a seJdom-voiced hope
that if war come, it would be a death-struggle between the Axis aM Soviet
2
Russia, fatal to both of Europe's terrors, Nazism and Communism."
The issue of preparedness is quite important. Notwithstanding arguments
to the contrary, prestige and military etreri.fth generally "talk" at the con-
ference table - being without them at least puts one at a significant disad-
vantage. Militarily, Britain arid ?rance fell behind 9emany after 1935. Re-
1. John W. V/heeler-Bennett, Munich t Prologue to Tragedy (New York, 1948), 14.
Hereafter cited as Wheeler-Bennett, Munich .
2. Raymond Pbineas Stearns, Pageant of Europe (!'ew York, 1947}, 925.
gardlng the situation in 1936, Winston Churchll stated (la Wovonhsf of that
year)
,
"Nothing could now prevent the Gasmen Air Force froa hennaing the
strongest in Europe, By extraordinary, disturbing exertions we could improve
our position. We could not cure it."-* By 193d dimsay bed whet wee general-
ly regarded as the strongest air force en the continent, and British end
French air defenses were alaost non-existent.* But it sust also he noted
that Geraany lacked the bases in 1938 for successful bonbing operations against
Englsod. In early 1936 the German Amy boasted 71 divisions of which 29 were
reserves.
5 On the other band, although the Bnglish Artsy consisted of only
S defensive divisions, France had appronlnataly 60 divisions and Csechoslo-
vafcia 32 eoneat-ready divisions behind fortifications which greatly impressed
officers after the take-over following Munich. On paper, the really
significant Allied weakness existed in eirpower and air defenses; Hitler
wall aware of these weaknesses.
Since England was the acknowledged lander of the Hesters Canp in 1936,
the importance of her relative unprepxroAneas for war suet not be undereetinated.
She wee not prepared for wer, Militarily or psychologically. The responsibility
for this lies primarily with the Baldwin and Chanherlain Covetisasnts and with
the Labor minority in the Chamberlain ere; the letter conelatently sought s
J. Winston Churchill, Yho Cothoriaa Stern (Sew York, 1961), 207. Hereafter
cited ee Churchill
, JQje Oath/^yaa, &&SES*
4. Ibid
. , 79, end noauasnta an Brltiah Foreign Policy , edited by S.L. Wood-
ward and Ehehan Butler, thiro SsrieeTvoi. II (London. 1949). En-
closure to report from Sir Erie Fhipps (Perls) to British Foreign
Offlee, Sept. 22, 193S, 474. Hereafter cited as Brltiah Documents .
5. Burckhart Mueller, ttlllabrond Daeheer . 1933-1945 (Frankfort, 19S4), Vol.1, 61.
6. Bone eey nearly 100. Bee William L. Shirer, JQ& Baft Urn T«u Si lB£
Belch (New York, 1960). 425.
7. Erich von Menstoin, Lost Victories (Chicago, 1956), 29.
1strong stand against Hitler but. iauaariMblv voted ffllifttmf«» Incraasao .
Arnold Toynbee subbmh! us tha situation in this wayt
"•Ware net tee Conaervativaa in favor of anus on tee under-
standing that they ware never to be used and the inter*
vantionists (nostly Lesorites) in favor of using than on
the understanding that they vara never to be provided?
It is true that Chanberlein did not inherit the office of Prim* Minister
until 1937 and that, by that tine, it would not have bean possible to wipe
out the load Geraany had achieved before Munich. Nevertheless, it is also
true that Chamberlain said nothing prior to hie accent to power which in any
way reflected concern over ail1tary deficiencies — nor did he for Quito sons
tins after aaeuaina. office . Me paid scant attention to warnings from the nill-
tant Conservative Minority, led by Winston Churchill and Anthony Boon, further-
ance, he "repeatedly assured the House of Crwwas and the Notion that the Govern-
want were satisfied with the progress of the reenaenent program."* Ota March 7,
1938, five days prior to tha AnachAuss in Austria, he told Cuaabus, "The si-
oat terrifying power that Britain is building up has a sobering effect on the
opinion of the world."10 It ssnss inceocelveble chat be could really have
believed what he publicly declared.
low groat an affect praperedaaea actually bad on ChamberIain's decision
to laplaasat and adhere to appoesewent is questionable, considering whet little
aention he ashes of it during the entire Czech crisis period. As an excuse
for his policy, it can be aade to appear slaost justifiable. At the cans tins,
however, one auat consider the overall strength of e potentlel eouater-actin»
8. Alfred F. Ravlghuret, Twentieth Century Britain (Evenston, 1962), 282.
Hereoftor cited as navighuret, Britain.
9/ Wheeler-Bennett, Munich. A3.
10. Greet Britain, House of Cannons . Parliamentary Debates , fifth Series, Vol. 338
(London, 1938), col 1560. Hereafter cited as Greet Britain, £.£. j&b.
,
(Vol. 338 or 339).
4power block — Including, let us asy, France, England, Russia, and Caechoelo*
vakl* — before concluding that, becauae Britain was not prepared for war,
oppeeenaeat waa tba only aolution.
Tha a«l f-determination concept node oppaaaenont possible* The ideala
enpreesed by ffoodrow Wilson, particularly Point 10 of his Fourteen Points
,
natch deelered for the principle of self-determination, were not in ell caaee
realiaed by the Treety of Versailles. The paeat treaty left all1 lone of Ger-
mane in other Bast European states. Moat regrettable ess the pissing of earns
three-million Sudeten Germane In the now Caeeheelovakie — questionable partic-
ularly becauae thia minority group had a common frontier with the lolch. Thus,
Chamberlein did net argue with hitler when the latter said he wee aimply pur-
suing a policy originated by the Alllee. Versailles wsa s wrong; Chamberlain
sought to undo this wrong by demonstrating to the Fuehrer his willlngneaa to
give Germany whet wes rightfully hers. having no faith in the League, he sought
to appeaae hitler, giving him what he demanded. All he eeamed to deeIre was
Hitler's premise that changes would be brought shout peecefully end that they
would have reasonable limits.
German rearmament (violations of the Versailles Treety), re-occupation
of the Rhineland (a violation of the Treaty end the Locarno Agreement) , the
Bcitloh Caiman navel Agreement, end Italian aggression la Ethiopia were fol-
lowed by the resignation in February, 1938, of Foreign Secretary Anthony Aden
who advocated collective security end standing up to Hitler.
when Hitler seised Austria on March 12, 1938, Chamberlain refused to
change hie course, no doubt rationalising that Its seiaure waa a realisation
of the eel f- determination principled
Inmediecely efter flfJlMlTlffil - **• *»*•**» Government proposed a Four-Power
conference (France, England, Russia sad Csechoalovekia) to prevent further eg-
* Actually he had implied his approval months in advance, and on March 3 Henderson
had told Hitler that Britain had washed her hands of Austria, provided that
the outcome could be designated as a "'reasonable solution reasonably achieved.'
See Wheeler-Bennett, Munich . 24.
fgreseloa. Ctiibcrlain refused, at luat la part hum of his dogmatism ia
the conduce of foreign affair*, hi* hatred of Bolshevism, sad his anxiety over
taa*l*a purges of the old-thirties which seriously affected the Military ea-
tabllshaaat. At the same time the Frlae Minister of Britain turned eotm a
proposal by s Labor body, representing the Labor Party end the National Labor
Council* to have Britain, Prance and Bussle unite la a ctawon stand against
the aggressor (flemsny) . Chamberlain sold that this would not be wise since It
would divide Europe and roister war Inevitable. 11 This leads us to the Coach
. p.i I A.,
During the oerly month* of 1938 Hitler had been waging an Intense propa-
ganda campaign agolnat Cseehoslovakle, demanding that she great autonomy to
the Sudetonlsnders. And en April 24, 1938, Konrad Rsnleln (accepted by Hitler
as the loader of the Gormen* In Ssechoelovakla) published the Kerlsbad Sight
Point* — d—ending, among other things, that Cseohoslovahla change her foreign
policy end that the Sudeten Gscmans be granted eanplete freedom to profess
adherence to the German national Socialist ideology,12 The Gceeh Government
would not even consider acceding to those demands.
At this point Britain began to act as a mediator between Sudeten Gasman
and Caoeh faction*. These efforts, culminating ia the 111-fated Bunclmos mis-
sion la Auguat, when Lord tunclmmt wo* sent (too late) to Cseehoslevakia la
an unsneeesful effort to bring them together, earns to naught. Clashes bstwoom
Cseeh police and Sudetenlendars occurred frequently. Henleln procleiaed thet
nothing short of complete autonomy would suffice, and Hitler throetsned to lu-
11. Charles Loch Mouse, Great; Britain Brntseen thj Wars . 1919-1940 (Chicago, 1953),
604. Hereafter cited mm Hewst, Britain.
12. Documents on Gesmmn Foreign Policy, Seriee D. , Vol. IX, 242. Memorandum
em Bight Points, April 24, 1938. Hereafter cited ee QM&Mt fitSMftf.*
6vade Czechoslovakia unless her President, Bdouud Benes, bowed to the Sudeten-Nasi
demands* Although Bones had regarded acceptance of the Karlsbad Sight Points as nation-
al suicide, by September 6, under pressure from Britain and France, he accepted them in
principle. But Henlein and Hitler had apparently developed a new strategy. At
Mahrisch-Ostrau on September 7, a Sudeten German Party delegate was allegedly maltreated
by a Csech raobj this provided an excuse for the Sudeten-Oermans to br-eak off negoti-
ations with Czechs and for their agitators to demonstrate mora vigorously against
alleged Csech oppression* Hitler himself further sparked the agitation in a speech
on the concluding day of the National Socialist Party Conjuresa at »urriberg(on the
32th), demanding self-determination for the Sudetenland. On the 13th the French Cab-
inet decided to let Chamberlain represent Britain and France in the manner which
he desired: a personal conference with the Future*. Hitler readily agreed to a meeting
at Berchtesgsden on the 15th*
Shortly before the Berchtesgnden Conference, Duff Cooper, the First Lord of the
Admiralty, encouraged Chamberlain to mobilise the fleet because, he maintained, it would
have a strong effect on Hitler and would show him that Britain could not be dictated
13
to | the Prims Minister refused".
At Berchtecf*aden, Chamberlain modified his policy only to the extent that he now
based his hopes £or its success on a personal meeting between the two chiefs of state.
Mere Hitler demanded that Czechoslovakia be made to Changs her foreign policy and
annul her alliances; he said that nothing short of self-determination for the Sudeten-
land would suffice* A second conference (Godecberg) was agreed upon since Chamberlain
had to report back to his cabinet and to the French.
In response to Hitler's demands, Britain and France (the latter reluctantly) decided
to grant Hitler what he had outlined. This resulted in the Anglo-French Ultimatum
to Cseehoslovakia (Septemberl9) ; it recognized the principle of self-determination in the
Herman regions of Czechoslovakia and demanded that the latter stats agree to "...self-
determination without a plebiscite to all the limitrophe Sudeten areas in which the pop-
14
illation was over 5C# German." President Benes sadly gave in on September 21.
13. Duff Cooper. Old Hen Forget (London. 1957). 228. Hereafter cited as Cooper,
Old Ken Forget .
14. British Documents . Notes on Anglo-French Conversations at lCDowning St., Sept. IS,
1938, 2^6-339, and Neville Henderson, Failure of & Mission York, 1941), 154-155.
On the eve of the Codesberg meeting, Poland, sensing her opportunity to secure
Czech territory which wee oubetantially Polish in terns of population, began
concentrating military forces along her entire frontier with Csechosiovekla. 13
These moves wore eoapleaeated by Hungary's expressed desire to regain elonenta
of her Magyar population. loot to Czecboelovakia at the dissolution of the
Austro-Hungarlan teplre (Treaty of Trianon, 1919) and agitation for the cession
of its Minority in Chechoslovakia. 16
According to the Russians, the scene in Prague on September 22 in-
cluded demonstrations expressing hope for assistance fron the U.B.S.&., de-
manding the overthrow of Semes* gowsrmeoat and proclaiming hatred for Hitler
IT
and Chamberlain alike. Chamberlain wss hardly interested in the fata of a
remote nation about which he know little - especially if the sacrifice sweat
the preservation of peace in Buropo - it was a simple case of the end justifying
the means.
Cooper, visited on the same day by Winston Churchill, relates that
"he [Churchill] mas in a great state of excitement and was violent in his
denunciation of the Prime Minister." Walking homo that night. Cooper saw, "a
vast procession. . . marching down Whitehall crying, 'Stand by the Czechs*
and 'Chamberlain must go.*"18 Although the latter observation is not import-
ant when considered alone, it is e symptom of the beginning of a "hardening"
of public opinion in Britain which crystallised When the results of the Cedes
-
15. Mjg Pocuwants SSL 3& History ££ Munich (Prague, 1952) , Telegram from S.
Alsmandrovsky, Russian Minister in Prague to People's Commissariat
for Foreign Affaire, Sept. 22, 112. Hereafter cited aa j&gg fiocumsnts.
ifi. Tja nurtrwiirf SmsSim* &spt. 22, ms, u.
17. Bow Documents. Telegram from Alexoodrovaky to Moscow, Sept. 22, 110.
IS. Cooper. Old Men Forget. 232.
Iberg Conference wr« made know to the public. This development will be giv«a
close attention In a later aactioa.
On September 17, Hugh Bel ton, former Undersecretary of Foreign Affaire,
euggeeted to Chamberlain that the and of the appeeacmeet process , " * aey well
be the liquidation both of the British Sepire end of our British liberties
o
And at each stege you will have fewer frlende and weaker allies to join you
in any stand you any, at sown late hour, decide to •aha.* Hut Chamberlain
paid scant attention to such warnings.
At Berchteegadea a second conference had bean agreed upon, and it waa
held on September 22nd and 33rd* At this Conference in Godeeberg hitler
blatantly declered that the Serchteegedan decisions were no longer enough.
In the so-called Godeeberg "memorsndum". Hitler demented that the Hungarian
and Polish claims also be met. that the German-speaking regions be ceded
forthwith — without removal or destruction of military and economic eeteb-
*
llsfamaata — and that there be plebiscites bj; districts by the 25tb of Novem-
ber, under Barman-Caech or International control. If Ccachoalovekla, Britain
and Prance did not agree, said Hitler, war would ensue. He would not enter In-
to a guarantee against unprovoked aggression (which he said waa Impossible to
define) against the (new) Csech state.*0 A shacked and dapreeaed Chamberlain
returned to England; whether he admittad it or not, ha waa in the clutches of
a blackmailer.
On September 19th Chamberlain had bean given information of another sort.
19. Cooper, Old Ham farget . 232. Perhaps he wee thinking of countries such
as Cxeehoelovakle, Rumania, and Poland which might ultimately be
forced to elllga themselves with Germany, if Britain continued to waiver.
20. Sea Bendereon, failure . 158-159, end British Documents . Motes of Conversa-
tion between Chamberlain and Hitler at Godeeberg, September 22, 1938,
471.
* In such areas where there was a large German population.
IOn the 18th H«rr von Kleist-Schmansln arrived in London to inform the British
of German opposition to Hitler in the Any. Be wee granted Interviews with Sir
Robert Vantlttert, Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs;Lloyd George,
the former Prise Minister who was still an influential Conservative; and Chur-
chill, regarded as the leader of the willtant Conservative minority. Kleist
told Vansittart that Rihhsntrop had assured Hitler that Prance and England
would not attempt to stop hia; Kleist reasoned that in view of this Hitler
would not limit hie demands and that the Hssl leader was perfectly willing to
risk war in order to get what he wanted. Re emphasised that aj.1
,
German generals
were opposed to war hut that they needed encouragement sad help from the out-
side If they were to successfully carry out a coup . After September 27, he
said, it would probably be too late because by than the carving-up of Czecho-
levefcl* gmghi NU M J||g MStMkk*
Kleist suggested that the British do ewe things; (1) show Hitler that
Prance and England meant business and that they would not tolerate sggreseion
end (2) have a top political figure in Britain appeal in a speech to the pop-
ulace of Germany end the German Amy. Kleist said that he sought Hitler's down-
fell as "a Conservative, a Prussian, and a Christian*" He steted emphatically
that Hitler would In all likelihood fall after his first real defect. 21
When Chamberlain learned of this, he wrote the following to Halifax:
"X take It that Von Kleist is violently anti-Hitler and is
extremely anxious to stir up his friends in Germany to
make ton ettempt at its overthrow. % gto»tnd» fat oj£ the.
jtcobites gt ste San ai Ismbh ia Sam lpte!i iSm ,2
ssA 1 J&eBm at "wit iissast a mi. 4**L si yJu& ta ua-
"
?1„ British Doeunents. Appendix, Tenelttert notes on converestion twlth Von
Kleist, Aug. 18, 1938, 683-8*16. (Italics mine).
22. Ibid . . Appendix, Aug. 19, 1938, 688.
Even after Godeaberg, when the writing wae on the wall, Chamberlain neglected
to so much as explore this possibility*
None of these new developments caused Chamberlain to deviate from or, it
seems, doubt his own diplomacy. The Munich week saw a continuation of his
appeasement policy and the final write-off of Czechoslovakia. Should Chamber-
lain have changed his course between September 24 and September 30? If he
should have, could he have done so? Was it necessary for him to accede to
Hitler's demands; did relative aras strengths rule out any other alternative;
would war have spelled defeat and perhaps annihilation for Britain and Prance?
If his decision to change had been made, could British public opinion have
been brought into concert with the policy change? And was there anything which
Chamberlain m?ght have had to gain for Britain by making a stand against the
dictators in September, 193&, and thereby risking war? These and other, related
questions will be dealt with in the ensuing pages.
II. France
Let us look briefly at Britain's principal ally. The French Hovernment
Had been led since April, 1938, by Premier Edward Daladier and by his Foreign
Minister, Georges Bonnet) trie latter might well be called the French person-
ification of the appeasement attitude. Wheeler-Bennett describes Daladier as
the "patriot without strength of win What Daladier claimed that he wanted
to do after Berehtesgqden (and at certain points prior to the, conference) was
stand up to Hitler and if necessary go to the defense of Czechoslovakia under
23
the provisions of the Franco-Czech Treaty of Mutual Assistance. This is clear,
for example, in the record of the Anglo-French conversations held in London on
24
September IS. But policy was really in the hands of Neville Chamberlain.
On September 13 Daladier told Sir Erie Phipps that, since the French Cabinet
was divided in counsels over the question of dealing with the Caech crisis, he pre-
ferred to hate Chamberlain go it alone and make the best bargain possible with
24*
Hitler. As soon as he got word of this, Chamberlain hatched his personal-meeting
concept) he met with Hitler at Berchtesgaden on the 15th.
Daladier himself was unmistakably weak. A.J .P. Taylor says that he followed
a regular pattern at various critical points - that he was always "first fall
of fight, then irresolute, and finally capitulating when it came to German demands.
Also, Wheeler-Bennett makes this perceptive observation: "...the tragedy of
Sdouard Daladier is that, when he became aware of the evils which sur-
23. Wheeler-Bennett, Munich. 67.
24. British Documents . Record of Conversations at 1/) Downing 3t., 376-386.
24* Wheeler-Bennett, Munich . i 04.
25. A .J .P. Taylor, Oriidns of the Second World War (New 'ork, 1962), 173.
Hereafter cited as Taylor, Origins .
12
rounded him, h« had not the strength of character to apply the drastic measures
necessary to remove then. He preferred to shift the onus of responsibility
elsewhere, rather than purse his entourage.
"
2*
A partial explanation is perhaps that the French Amy, although slseeble,
was neither modem nor possessed of the capabilities to sustain effective of-
fensive warfare. The Maginot Line was purely defensive in character, and the
troops were cogs in the defensive, mechanise). The Air Force was outdated, having
been neglected until January of 1938 when newlyappointed Air Minister N. Suy
La Ghsabre hastily began the sorely needed revltalization job. In September
of the seme year, however, she was hardly s match for the Luftwaffe which had
a head-start in production of modern aircraft on both France and Britain.
But few French leaders thought that the situation was hopeless. On Septem-
ber 24, Sir Brie Phipps, British Ambassador in Paris, reported to Foreign Secre-
tary Balifax that the French Chief of Staff, General Game1in, said that the only
way to peace waa to demonstrate that Francs was prepared to fight. As a result,
reservists necessary to bring the Maginot Line defenses to full war efficiency
ware mobilised, and a second group of seven divisions was dispatched to the
frontier area.28 This brought French active military strength close to one mil-
lion men. 29 The attitude of the French Government and the maa-on-the-street after
Oodeshsrg is rather difficult to assess. However, the following strands of evi-
dence may be noted. Former Premier Pierre Flandin said on September 24 that the
26. Wheeler-Bennett, Munich. 67.
27. Winston Churchill, The fofdrifts <»«* York, 1962* , 213. Hereafter
cited as Churchill, Storm,.
2S. British Documents. Fhlpps (Paris) to Halifax (London), September 24, 150*.
29. JJ& Bait Tor* Times . Sunday, September 23, 1938, 1.
li
peasant class wee overwhelmingly opposed to war and that If they had to fight
their hearts would not be In it. 3* 1 Phippe also said that if a war vote ware
taken in the Chamber and Senate, there waa some question as to what the outcome
would be . He did cdd:
"Most observers consider, however, that if the Germans in-
vaded Chechoslovakia and Chechoslovakia resisted with heavy
casualtiea it would be difficult to keep public opinion
within bounds for longer than ten days. "31
About all that can be drawn from this is that, by the time Chechoslovakia had
been demolished, the conscience-stricken French would have belatedly shown s
willingness to enter the fray. Fiandln concluded by saying, "All that is
best in Franco is against war, almost; at any price."32 Of course , what la
"best" la France la open to question.
Or September 25, Fhipps reported that the President of the French Finance
Commission, Joseph Calllaux, had stated that a large majority of the French
people and a large majority of the French Senate were against war. Fhipps also
spoke of M. Calllaux' anxiety in the face of this crisis.
"War with Germany means war with Poland, Hungary and Japan.
In the air, our towns will be wiped out, our women and
children will be slaughtered. The French Army will fight
magnificently. . . .It will be incidentally safer in ita
Haginot Line than civil lane. Heavy air bombardments of
factories round Faris may well cause another Commune."33
To put this view in its proper perspective, however, let it be noted that Call-
laux had been a declared pacifist even during World War I. And the United Skates
Ambasssdor to France, William Bullitt, said at this time that the French people
30. irltish Documents. Fhipps (Peris) to Halifax (London) , September 24, 509.
31. Ibid . . 510.
32. Ibid . . 510.
33. Ibid .. Telegram from Fhipps (Paris) to Halifax (London), September 25, 513.
14
would hm fought for this causa,,-***
On tha 26th „ after tin publication of Hitler's Godesberg memorandum,
Phipps reported a sharp change in
(
French public opinion. The President of
the Chamber, Edward Harriot, "confirmed tha complete sign-over of public
opinion since Hitler '« denands had becoae known,, He assures ne that an over*
whelming Majority in the Chamber will now be for resistance."39 Harriot urged
that tha matter be brought before tha League Council as soon as possible to
prevent Germany from claiming that Prance and Great Britain were the aggressors,
la case tha latter should decide to stop Hitler forcibly. 36
Apparently the indignation lasted little longer than does any moment of
passion; fear of war and hope for peace, even at the price of Csechoalovahia
and French honor, quickly replaced it. the change seems to have coincided with
Seville ChaaberlainS September 23 announcement of Hitler's invitation for a
meeting at Munich. On this date, Phipps telegraphed Halifax: "The only whole
party that favors war now asm the Communists. Evan the Socialists are divided
. . . .Representatives of 200 deputies are going to K. Daladler this morning and
Chan to the President of the Republic to protest against being led into war en
A —f fueftiofi of procedure."37 Could It be that a question of honor - and one
that had deep strategic connotations for the future - had become a question of
procedure (i.e., legal or illegal invasion of the Sude&enland by forces of the
3*> tsaakm Mlttm, 8l m. mm* Diplomatic Papers. 19S3. Vol. I.
General (Washington, 1955) Telegram from Hilllam Bullitt (Paris) to
Cordell Hull (Washington), Sept. 24, 641. Hereafter cited as U.S.
35. HrUlffr SSSUK&&£. H»lpps to Halifax, September 26, received 2:15 P.M., 547.
36. Ibid.. 547.
37. Ibid. . 588. (Italics mine) . It is probably very seldom indeed that any whole
party favors war. The fact that many saw this to be merely a oueatloa
of procedure tells us a greet deal about French leadership at the time.
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Third Belch)?
This glvas us an idea of tha Internal condition of Britain*a ally during
the September criaiti period. Public opinion cannot be accurately gauged by
listening em only, for emampie,t»the atamsants of an avowed anti-Has1, such as
Call 1sua. But it la true that in Prance there was confusion and lack of unity
during much of the crisis period.
On September 25, before the French delegation left for the Meeting with the
British at 10 Downing Street, the French Cabinet waa apparently, waited ln its
determination to show Hitler that he could not have ell he wanted end under the
conditions which he wanted But French enthusiasm for standing up to Hit-
ler was itself wholly dependent upon the attitude of the British. It wee quickly
extinguished by British determination to avoid war at all costs. Bullitt ac-
curately forecasted the end result on September 25:
"I believe that if the British Government again should take
the attitude that peace must be preserved et any price Da-
ladler would not resist long. The ultimate decision will
be mode by the Srltiah Cabinet in London, "39
38. The aew York Times . Monday, September 26, i«3B, 1.
39. U.S. Foreleg, Relations . Bullitt (Paris) to Secretory of State Bull <Wabh-
ington), September 25, 19JB, 64B.
III. Inaction to Godesberft i September 23-35 *
On September 23, speaking at a meeting of the Sixth Policy Commission of
the League of Nations, Maxim Litvinov, People 1 s Commissar for Foreign Affaire
in the Soviet Union, stated that the "German-Frenoh-British Ultimatum" to
Chechoslovakia technically ruled out Russian obligation to the Czechs, in that
by treaty (Czech-French Treaty of Mutual Assistance, 1924) the Soviet Union
was not obliged to act unless France did so first. But, he stated, the
"Soviet Government ....replied to Prague that, in the event of France grant-
ing assistance under the conditions mentioned in the (Czech) inquire, the Sov-
40
iet Pact will again enter into force." He emphasised that his should make
it clear that the Soviet Union did not seek to free herself of obligations.
She hoped to prevent German aggression, apparently through League channels,
but under combined French, English, and Russian leadership. The suggestion,
41
however, fell on deaf ears.
Also on September 23, French Premier Daladier asked the British, through
Phipps, n 'whether the moment has not now come for vis to cancel advice we gave
Czechoslovak' Government not to tnobilize,'" as he felt that tie responsibility
involved in advising against mobilization was too great. Against, it seems,
the wishes of Neville Chamberlain, Halifax ordered the canceling of the above-
42
mentioned advice later that day. The British delegation at Oodesberg cabled
40* New Documents. 115*
41. Churchill, Gathering Stora. 273.
42. British Documents. Telegram, Phippe (Paris) to Halifax (London), Septem-
ber 23, 481.
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this statement iron Chamberlairs:
"Th* Cscch Government must bear in mind announcement of
Chclr moblllention My well entail lssaediate order to
Geraan Amy to attack CEechoalovakia."43
For their part, before receipt of the o.k 8J it seems, the Czechs mobilised in '
earnest. This was announced to Hitler and Cbanbarlain aid-way in their second
Godesberg session on September 23.
After s preliminary meeting at Codesberg on the 22nd during which the two
parties found no common ground to stand on, Chamberlain and Hitler separated
temporarily. Sometime during this interlude, Hitler wrote a letter to Chamber-
lain which reveale the eaeense of and thinking behind the Codasberg Honorandum.
In it Hitler expounded upon the treatment of Germane in Czechoslovakia and
claimed that in recent days some 120,000 refugees, alleged victims of Czech op~
proasion, had streamed into the Reich. He made it clear that he would rectify
the situation one way or another, quickly, and without fell. The 14 Points of
1918, he addad, expressed a belief on the part of the victorious powers in the
principle of self-determination; he (Hitler) wes now no longer interested in re-
cognition of but in realization o? thi-i principle. Thus, lie said, his demands
must be met. Be proaise.1 that on Che day of the plebiscites he would withdraw
troops from "nose of the disputed frontier areas" (this was so vague that it com-
mitted him to absolutely nothing) , In the letter he also questioned MM sinceretv
of the Csechs on the basis of long experience with them.*5
On September 24th Chamberlain agreed to reject the Godesberg demands and
to give Prance assurances of British support, la the event that Prance had to
43. Ibid . . British Delegation (Godesberg) to Newton (Prague), Sept. 23, 4U4-485.
44. great Britain, H.C. Debs, 5s, Vol. 339, Speech by Chamberlain, Sept. 28, Col.^2.
45. Mtftfl |W— 495-487.
IB
coomb to the aid of Chechoslovakia. "In doing so," says Wheeler-Bennett,"the
Government had the unanimous support of the majority of the iritlsh press and
public."46 This writer siso notes that, on the 26th, articles protesting the
Godesberg Hemorandtn appeared in the Pailv Talearoph . The Times end the nan-
chaster Guardian .47 This raises a significant point: public opinion can be
changed radically, provided the national leadership (1) releases information,
at the right tine, which has the potential to get right et the "heart" of the
emotions of the public end/or (2) emphatically urges the wind of the country
to "think" e particular wey. In this case, it took only point (1) to shift
the feelings of the British public for several days during the critical week —
end, ironically, the leadership did not seek such an effect.
A somewhat similar change occurred in France where Daladior ordered a partial
mobilisation on the 24th, and Chief-of-Staff Gemelln voiced optimism regarding
comparative military strengths of Czechoslovakia and Franca vis-a -via Germany;
ha ssld that French foreign policy had been out of proportion to Hie military
strength of the nation.4y The implication was that it was time to get tough end
that it was feaaible to do eo.
However, Chamberlain was not in the least bit interested in abandoning his
policy (appeasement of Hitler end peace at almost any price) , in spite of this
hardening of opinion in Britain. At a Cabinet Heating on September 24, Cooper
reletes, Chamberlain "snorted" with indignation at Hitler's terms, but "he
[Chamberlain J concluded, to my astonishment , by saying that he considered that
we should accept those terms end that we should advise the Csechs to do so*"49
46. Wheeler-Bennett, Munich . 14G.
47. Ibid .. 140.
48. Ibid . . 141.
49. Cooper, CJd geg forget . 234.
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Cooper could not contain hinaelf
.
"I said that Iran what the P.M. had told ue, It appeared to
a» that the Qsrmans ware atill convinced that under no
eireunatancea would we fight, that there still existed
one Method end one method only of persuading then to the
contrary, and that was by Instantly declaring full mobili-
sation. I said that I was sure public opinion would e-
ventuelly conpel us to go to the aaalstance of the Caechs;
that hitherto we had been faced with the unpleasant alter-
natives of peace with dishonour or war. Z now saw a third
possibility: Homely, war. wj£b dishonour. £g which J> —ant
beins kicked into the war bj£ tjje, boo^ oj: Public coining when
thou tait-h uha u> fiokttn,. Had iliu<hi W» A**m**mA »o0ilatft xntb timm mat UsbUs* tat* *Uas& been, itkisssl-
In other words, Chamberlain wee ready to surrender to Hitler almost ianedlatsly
after Codeeberg; the impression he presented to the world at the tine, however,
was quite different.
Cooper also tells of s brief, private conversation he had with Hal Ifas
after the cabinet nesting. When Cooper remarked that Chamberlain could not
now get this policy through the House of Cannons (If he hod to), "to my (Cooper's
j
surprise he said, *0f course he can't', and want on to tell no of the strength
of feeling et Oxford. . . . among all parties against surrender.
"
5l
ft seems that at this juncture - perhaps for the first time - the syaptome
of a cleavage between the eppcessment policy of Heville Chamberlain and the at-
titude of British public opinion were in evidence.
In the meantime, the Csoche themselves sopeared mere reedy then ever to
resist the Germans. The "honor" principle dominated thinking in Czechoslovakia,
and determined leadership couia have rsliieu ouuile opinion to a spirited defease
against the German invader. GO September 25, the German Charge d'affaires in
50. Ibid . . 2J4-2J5.
51. Ibid . . 135.
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Prague, Andor Hancke, reported Co his Foreign Ministry that the Czech attitude
toward Germany was "stiffening increasingly" and that Denes then really believed
that he could count on "Russia, Prance and perhaps Britain".'2
Russia continued to emphasise that she fully Intended to aid the Czechs if
the Germans Invaded. On September 25, Litvlnov cabled the Air Attach! of the
U.S.S.R. In Prance to tell Gomel in that Russia had (1) placed thirty infantry
divisions on her Western frontiers, (2) brought up the necessary reserve rein-
forcements and (3) brought aviation and tank units to s condition of "full readi-
ness".33 This information was transmitted to Camelin in London on the 26th, where
the French Chief- of -Staff was reiterating his semi-optimistic estimates of Allied
strength to the British Government.
Thus it seems clear that the potential for united counter-action to the
German threat existed during the Munich week. The British Prime Minister,
however, never considered changing horses In mid-stream.
At this point it is imperative that we tkJtCa closer look at Russia and what
she might or might not have meant to the makers of British policy.
52. Documents On German Foreign Policy . Series D, Volume II (Washington, 1949),
930-931. Telegram, Andor Hancke (Prague) to German Foreign Office
(Berlin) . Hereafter cited aa German Documents.
53. Hew Documents . 118.
xv. sustia
The era of Maxim Litvinov, People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the
U.S.S.R., Is narked by a consistent effort to bring about effective implementa-
tlon of collective security under the League of Nations - specifically, to
check the advance of Nasi Germany in Central Europe. Of course, this probably
vas true because of the Soviets' fear of Germany and because playing along with
collective security at the time offered them their most favorable position
vis > vis Germany, the most threatening of Russia's enemies . In March, 1938,
immediately after the Austrian Anschluss
.
Litvinov sought collective action
under the League to stop territorial aggrandisement on the part of the Third Reich .
The League let the proposal die, largely because Britain was not at all receptive
to such a move.
On September 3 the French Charge d 'Affaires in Moscow saw Litvinov and
reported that the latter told him that Russia would support France in a war
over violations of Czechoslovakia^ territory and that Litvinov had proposed
immediate staff talks among Soviet, French end Czech experts; he also reported
the Litvinov favored raising the question of Germany's threat to Czechoslovakia
at Geneva, under Article 11 of the League of Nation* & with the hope that Ro-
mania and Poland might thereby be injected with a degree of faith in the Allies;
finally, ha said Litvinov had advised that France, Britain and the Soviet Union
54. The Treaty £f Versailles
,
and After . U.S. Government Printing Office.
(Washington, 1947), 83-34. Article 11: "Any war or threat of war,
whether Immediately affecting any of the Members of the League or
not, is hsreby declared a matter of concern to the whole League,
and the League shall take any action that may be deemed wise and
effectual to safeguard the peace of nations. ..."
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send a note to Hitler warning him not to resort to force. 55 According to Ivan
Maisky, Russian Ambassador In Britain, French Foreign Minister Rennet suppress-
ed this Litvlnov offer on "four or five different occasions". 56 Later on
this day, Maisky visited Winston Churchill, and the latter Indicated that he
was in favor of the Litvlnov proposal. Hewevery For«.<£«. ^cceVex-w Ha&'<^»
said on September 5 that he did not like the Article 11 idea (in line with
Chamberlain's complete lack of faith in the League of Nations), but he said
that he "'would keep it in mind* ".57 Obviously, he pushed it far out of his
mind. According to Kagan, the Soviet Charge1 d 'Affaires in Czechoslovakia,
Chamberlain rejected the proposal. 58
to
In a major address A the Plenary Meeting of the League of Nations in Geneva
on September 21, Litvlnov reminded his eudience that at the time of Anschluss
he had advocated collective preventive measures. Relative to the question of
Russian adherence to her corns!tment to the France-Czech Treaty of Mutual As-
sistance, he said, "He intend to fulfill our obligations under the pact and to-
gether with France, to afford assistance to Czechoslovakia bv the ways open to
as," He called for a French-Czech-Russian conference. o£ uumc Ae^r! roenV WexJb * *A 5>xv<i
that the entire question should be raised under Article 11 of the League. Two
days before, said Litvlnov, he had answered the Czechs in "the affirmative" when
they asked whether or not Russia would aid France in the defense of Czechoslovakia.
55. Daiton.H., Mwjoj£S, 134.
56. Ibid . „ 184. (This occurred sometime in early September.)
57. Ibid., 185.
58. Ibid., 183. (No specific date of rejection given,)
59. New Documents . 105-107. (Italics mine - The wording here merits cafeful
scrutiny.)
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Sir Erie Phlppa reported this and the Bonnet reaction to it!
"M. Litvinov said Russia would only come in after France
had already come in, and that she would request Council
of League to recommend to Rumania to allow passage of
Russian aeroplanes over Rumanian territory. M. Bonnet
is not much impressed by this prospective late and limit-
ed Ru33ian help. He now further fears Poland would also
be on the wrong side in the event of war.n 6o
Dalton makes no attempt to disguise his conviction that Bonnet lied about
61
Russian intentions to Allied leaders.
On the other hand, the United Kingdom Delegation at Geneva did report
to Halifax on September 23 that Litvinov and Maisky had promised to come to
62
the aid of Czechoslovakia, were France to do so as well. Here the British
made their soli? diplomatic overture of the entire Czechoslovakian crisis
period (April through September) to confer with Russiaj the United Kingdom dele-
gation suggested that British, French, and Russian representatives get together
and discuss vital issues. The Russians were delighted and suggested a three-
power meeting away from Geneva, to show the Germans "we mean business ." However
,
the British and French never followed it up with an official acceptance or pro-
posal - the fact that Litvinov had made such a proposal might well have been
suppressed by those higher up, perhaps by Chamberlain himself. This was the
extent of Anglo-Soviet diplomatic contact through Munich.
60. British Documents
.
Telegram from Phipps (Paris) to Halifax (London), Sept.
22, 4$9. (Italic s mine - there was certainly nothing "late" about
this Russian offer).
61. Hugh Dalton, Memoirs, 183,
62. British Documents
.
Telegram, United Kingdom Delegation (Geneva) to Halifax
ifLondon), Telegram, Seot. 24, 497.
63. Taylor, Origins . 180.
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At this tin* Russia also sent • warning to Poland regarding the consequences
of a Polish attack on the Teachen area,64 in answer to reports of Polish forces
on the Czech frontier.
The German Ambassador to the Soviet Union, Priedrich Werner von der Schu-
lenburg, reported 4 oca Moscow on Sep teabar || that it should be noted that the
Russians had been making appreciable noise only after Berchtesgadea and that
Litvinov had stated that Russia would help Czechoslovakia "in the ways open to
us."65 (However, Schulenburg's message shews concern over the fact that Litvinov
had been making «sve;<y effort to get Prance to fulfill her obligations.") 66
Furthermore » the Russian offers cannot be taken at face value , for thtre
.are important sub-surface realities which must be considered. In the first
place, it must be rejrasibered that Communism envisaged an inevitable, ultimate
«Mf among the capitalist powers which would pave the way for the global spread
of the Communist ideology, Whether or not Russia saw this as an opportune moment
to spur the "capitalists" against each other is open to question; in view of
"ho orainous menace of Germany and in view of the fact that Litvinov had been
retained as Foreign Commissar s this does not seem likely. This is not to say
that the long-range aims of the Soviet Union should not be kept in mind; they
must be if she If fro be dealt with realistically.
Perhaps more important in this instance is what George P.
"annan refers to as the "basic geographic reality which underlay the entire
chapter of Soviet partnership in the policy of collective security." The U.S.S.R.
,
S4« Ibid. . 498.
65. German Documents . Telegram from Schulanburg (Moscow) to German Foreign Ministry
(Berlin) , 946. (This was to imply that Russia had few, if any "ways"
that she might help. The consent is shrewd.)
66. Ibid . . 94B.
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be say*, did not have a canon border with Germany} between her and the Retch
stood Poland and Rumania, both of which feared the dangers of allowing Russian
troops to cross their territory to get to Czechoslovakia since the U.S.S.R. had
long claimed that large areas of these nations were rightfully hers. In that
Russia was well aware of this., she could conduct her foreign policy with the
assuring knowledge that, she had a "ready-made excuse for delay in meeting its
obligations of mutual assistance", should she deem it advisable to iivoke it. 67
Poland could hardly have been led to giving Puesia permission in September, 1938,
because she distrusted her and because she did not wish to annoy Germany.**8
Rumania was more susceptible to the idea tJvui Poland, but Kennan says that there
is no evidence that she ever gave the Russians the green light* Moreover, the
tiew York Times noted on September 21: "It was believed the Rumanians had refused
. , . .to permit free passage of men and material for war if Russia were the
only power going to the aid of Czechoslovakia."70
Kennan also adds this interesting bit of information: the German Military
Attache1 in Prague during the Munich crisis period later told Kennan that the
physical characteristics of the Rumanian railroad network were such that "it
would have taken the Soviet command approximately three months to move a division
into Slovakia MM this primitive and indirect route." Kennan's conclusion
is that, although there was "a good chance that at the time the Csech Republic
raight have been saved," it certainly could not have been don* by the Soviet
67. George F. Kennan, Russia and the West Under Lenin and Stalin (Boston, 1961)
,
323. Hereafter cited as Kennan, Russia and the West .
68. Caslair Sraogorzewski , "Poland; Free, Peaceful, Strong", Foreign Affairs,
Vol. 13, 1934-1935, 647.
70. The Hew York Times . Wed., September 21, 1938, 8 (Italics mine).
71. Kennan, Russia and the West . 323.
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Union (alone)
.
Kennan does not discuss the possible use of Russian air power. But Charles
A. Lindbergh, of American military intelligence, bad seen all of the world's
major air forces perforin in training maneuvers at the time. **e had been lavish
in his praise of the German Air Force, saying that the Luftwaffe was then the
strongest air force in the world and that England and Francs were too weak in
73
the air to protect themselves alone. But he admitted that Russia probably had
a sufficient number of planes to make her weight felt in any war she might enter.
Hsnce, even if Russia had or had not been able to send ground forces to aid
Csechoslovakla, she most likely w> uld have been able to contribute appreciable
air support. Air passage over Rumanian territory could probably have been
secured if France were also coming to the air of Czechoslovakia. And it was
in the air that Czechoslovakia was weakest.
Chamberlain's entire appeasement policy ruled out even so much as discuss-
ing the problem with Russia. He had long distrusted the U .S „S .R . and was even
more apprehensive after the Russian purges of the late '30»s which were disquiet-
74
ing to the entire outside world, although others such as Winston Churchill were
still receptive to Idtvinov's and Maisky's pleas. Most important as far as the
Prime Minister was concerned was the simple fact that since his efforts to
achieve pefce for his time were based on cooperation with Hitler, Russia had to
be ignored (" ...if any deal was to be made with Hitler, this would be one of
72. U.S. Foreign Relations. Telegram, Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Joseph
~* ~ Kennedy) to Sec. of State (Cordell Hull), London, Sept. 22, 73.
73. Mowat, Britain. 60S.
74. Halton, Memoirs . 190.
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Hitler', chief conditions"). 75 A. the Manchester Guardian said on September
24, 1938;
"It has been a misfortune of our own policy that It has been
so chilly towards Russia. The reason must have been that
any sort of cooperation with her would have been unpalat-
able not only to Hitler but also to Mussolini, who had adopted
the * Bolshevism' argument as the camouflage for his designs
In Spain against Prance end against British security. The
result Is not to be seen. We have got nothing e£ ajj, Jor
ou£ attempts tg win the favour of j&e Dictators & cold-shoulder-
lag, Russia."?^
Of course, Stalin was also a dictator, and the Guardian apparently was not
quite cognizant of this. But the main point of this writer's argument lies
in the italicised portion of the above question.
Chamberlain had,it seems, so blindly devoted himself to the Reich-oriented
appeasement policy that he could not even consider the possibility of discussing
the questions of the day with the Soviet Union. It is true that Russian aid
would probably have been negligible to begin with, with the possible exception
of air power, but this does not seem to be why he ignored her offers; there
Is no evidence available that he even gave them enough thought to have done so
for that reason.
75. Mowat, Britain . 609.
76. Manchester Guardian . September 24, 1938, 12 (Italics mine).
On September 25, at the opening ©f the British-French meeting which
foHewed the Oedeeberg Conference and ;itl*r»s sasraorandt>m, Chamberlain said that
the Fiihrer'* projected seizure of Cseeh territory was analagoas to the seiz-
ure of conquered territory, "hen he told Hitler this, the letter aadd that
the Caecha had the choice of agreeing to a nationality frontier now or later
77
seeing Germany create a "strategic" frontier.
flaladiar said, ranch as he had in the opening rounds of all conversations
dTjring the Cseeh crisis, that France could not recognize the talcing of any
Caech territory If force and that France oprose-? plebiscites in certain
Czech areas since the population of these areas was predominant! • Cseeh and
since (toman troops would most likely appear wherever there were plebiscites*
hoatoerlain said that Hitler just wasted "to show that the proportion of the
7®
German population was larger than had been supposed,"
Chamberlain, obviously attempting to modify the French antipathy to
Hitler's Oedeeberg demands, said that the only real difference between the
Angle-P eneh proposals of September 18 and Hitler's were that in the latter
Hitler had said that the areas with German majorities should be occupied
79
"forthwith" by German troops*
77. British Documents., Anglo-French Conversations at 10 Dowsing St., Septeatoer
25, I935752I-522. (It is difficult to determine the difference).
76. Ibid .. 52?.
79. Ibid .. 525.
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Daladie* said that it was Franca 11 s "duty" to stand by Czechoslovakia. The
British asked precisely what France would do in the case of war. She would
draw the greater part of the German Amy against Trance, said Oaladier. Sir
John Simon, Chancellor of the Exchequer, then asked If the French intended sim-
ply to man the Maglnot Line and stay chore. To this Baladier replied that it
"depended" on the circumstances. 80
Then the French Fremier stated that "he thought that, In spite of Hen
Hitler's recent declarations, the German system of fortifications was much less
solid than Herr Hitler had Indicated "and that it would be several months before
the Siegfried Line would be really strong. "SI Again Oaladier emphasized the
question of honor and said that although France was willing to allow German
occupation of areas in which the Sudeten inhabitants were in a definite majori-
ty, the Codesberg proposals would "lead straight to war."
Chamberlain then said that he "wished to speak quite frankly and say that
the British Government had received disturbing accounts of the condition of the
Trench Air Force and of the capacity of French factories to maintain supplies
for the air force, which was likely to suffer great losses in the early days
of a war." Bow would France defend herself against German bombing, and how
would public opinion react to French participation in a war?®^
Oaladier admitted French military weaknesses but pointed out that "one
million Frenchmen have manned the frontiers without hesitation" end that France
was still capable of mobilizing an air force and of attacking Germany. "Must
30. Ibid . . 526-527.
82. Ibid . . 537.
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we Always give way to Hitler's ultimata?"8 -3 he asked. If so, he continued,
there was no point In having (Anglo-French) meetings. We are 'too modest", he
said, pointing out that Russia had a significant air force (5,000 planes) and
that England could use her fleet for blockading Germany. 3*
The meeting closed after Chamberlain said that this was all u£ to. France
£2 decide . The trick was, of course, that Daladier knew that he could do nothing
without England because France alone was too weak vis-a-vle the Raich . But by
the same token, it seems that Chamberlain knew that he could always bring the
French around - it took merely a little time and patience. Zn the final analy-
sis, it appears that neither government really meant business.
Also on September 25, the Czech Minister in London, Jan Kasaryk, wrote to
Halifax on behalf of his Government that Czechoslovakia had agreed to the "so-
called Anglo-French Plan" for ceding parts of Czechoslovakia but that Godesberg
raised entirely different questions calling for a new decision. Masaryk continued:
"My Government has now studied the document and the map. It
is a de facto ultimatum of the sort usually presented to a
vanquished nation and not a proposal to a sovereign state
which has shown the greatest possible readiness to make sac-
rifices for the' appeasement of Europe. . . .[the proposals}
deprive us of every safeguard for our national existence. ...
the whole process of moving the population is to be reduced
to panic flight on the part of those who will not accept the
German Nazi regime. They have to leave their homes without
even the right to take their personal belongings or even, In
the case of peasants, their cow. . . . Herr Hitler's demands
in their present form are absolutely and unconditionally un-
acceptable to my government."85
On the following day, the British-French discussions were resumed. Chamber-
83. Ibid . . 532.
84. Ibid., 533. (as far as the British were concerned, the Russians were
not included In any "we" thinking).
»5. British Pocumeqts, 518-519.
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lain announced that he had sent his confidant. Sir Horace Wilson, to aee the
Ftfhrer personally in a last-ditch attempt to reach a peaceful agreement; the
meeting was to take place Just prior to a major speech that Hitler would deliver
on the evening of the 26th. Sonnet end Halifax agreed that the the Czech
Government should be Informed of the Wilson mission. With this the two-day
meeting came to a conclusion, boasting little accomplishment, whatever the
press releases about "complete agreement" and "mutual understanding" might
have implied.
Chamberlain's letter to Hitler, delivered by Wilson on the 26th, stressed
that in his "capacity as an intermediary" he had delivered the Godesberg memor-
andum and map to the Czech Government, who had in turn ruled it totally unac-
ceptable. Occupation by force, wrote the Prime Minister., would spall war; and
world public opinion would unite against Germany. He concluded by imploring
M
Hitler not to go to uar and asking for further Czech-German negotiations.
Hitler, sensing realisation of his aims regarding Czechoalovakia, was hardly
interested In the appeal.
Ibid . . Letter from Chamberlain to Hitler , .September 26, 19S8, 541-542.
VI. From the Wilson Mission to Chamberlain's
Speech in Commons . September 28.
On Che 26th Basil Newton, British Ambassador to Czechoslovakia, reported
from Prague that order among the Czech forces at the front had been "well -main-
tained" and that the Czech mobilisation had been "going well and according to
plan."87 Fran Washington Franklin 0. Roosevelt appealed to Hitler to avoid the
use of force. And in Berlin itself, the foremost confidant of Neville Chamber-
lain, Sir Horace Wilson, came before the Ftlhter .
When Sir Horace Wilson gave Hitler word of the Czechs' refusal, the Gar-
man leader was utterly disgusted, seemingly near the end of his patience. When
he came to the words "Czech Government. . . .regard as wholly unacceptable the
proposal. . . .", ha moved to leave the room, making it clear that he would in-
vade Czecholaovakla and cared little if England and France retaliated."0 This
was probably histrionics in part since (1) Hitler knew how little likelihood
there wee of Anglo-French retaliation and since (2) he expected Wilson to react
just the way he did.
Wilson bit. He urged Hitler to have no fear, for Chamberlain would make
certain that Czechoslovakia did hand over the territory. Hitler replied that
his patience was running out on this score. Wilson said that Chamberlain would
like to see a Czech representative in Berlin, to which Hitler replied that there
might be one only if he came on the basis of the German (Godesberg) memorandum
and added that he had heard that Masaryk in London had been playing for the
87. Ibid . . Telegram to Halifax, (London), 544-545.
38. Ibid., Notes of Conversation between Sir Horace Wilson and Hitler, Berlin
September 26, 1938, 554-555.
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overthrow of Chamberlain.
That evening Wilson sent word to Chamberlain that Czechoslovakia oust ac-
cept the memorandum, including the date of October 1 for evacuation. "At one
rtage he (Hitler) intimated that unless evacuation were agreed to by Wednesday
afternoon (September 28) occupation night begin before October l."90
Hitler's speech to the German people on the evening of September 26 was
in lsrgs measure an expanded repetition of what he had said to Wileon. Chamber-
lain was to voice his opinion, after hearing it, that Che "chief burden" of
Hitler's speech was that Csech promises were "worth nothing" and that "Banes
won't ever carry out his promises „"91-
On the following day Wilson continued his discussion with Hitler - with
;h- same results. The notes of these conversations reveal a teck? ess impatience
and self-assurance on the part of Hitler and a serai -abject, pleading on the part
Wilson. The latter opened by playing up the Chamberlain-Hitler desire to
improve the "economic position all around." Almost immediately Hitler had hLa
on tha defensive. The Czech refusal, he said, means that Prance will attack
Germany and that England will .support francs. Wilson demurred. Hitler then
angrily criticized the Czechs' "frivolous g3me of precipitating a world war."92
The net result of these conversations was nii» as least so tar as the British
cere concerned.
89. Ibid . . 555-557.
90. Ibid . . Talegram from Henderson (Berlin) to Halifax (London), reporting
Wilson's meeting with Hitler, 353.
91. Ibid . . Telegram from Halifax to Henderson (Berlin) , September 27, 572.
92. Ibid., Motes of Conversation between Wilson and Hitler, Berlin, September
27, 565-567.
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Later that day the British fleet end auxiliary air force were finally
mobilize*. 93
At 81 30 p.a. on the 27th Phipps received a rather curious telegram from
Halifax on the Gsmelin estimates.
"General Camel in made it plain to us on Monday £26t:h]} that,
in his view, if (toman forces now invaded Czechoslovakia,
Czech resistance is likely to be of extremely brief duration.
This disturbing estimate ie confirmed by our Military Attach*
in Berlin who had just returned from Czechoslovakia and
reports that he is convinced that morale is poos end that
resistance will prove to be feeble."94
This is curious because Cmselin had only a few days before implied that the
Czechs could hold out quite adequately if France were to provide a second
front by declaring war on Germany as soon as Germany invaded Chechoslovakia,
provided she actually did so. And if the morale were really as low as Halifax
claimed (which is doubtful) , this was probably attributable to the Czechs'
lack of confidence in France and Britain and to various ethnic groups repre-
sented in the Czech forces, with conflicting loyalties (it is difficult to
estimate the effect of this r*alley) . Umethaless, demonstrations against the
Munich agreement a few days later and suicides among front-line troops after the
signing of the Pact reflect a reasonably broad deterainetioa to resist. There
is also a footnote in the British ftscementa to Halifax's telegram on the 27th
which states that Camel in indicated that the Czechs could hold out "for a few
weeks, perhaps not for a few months"; that depended to a large extent on what
Poland did." For his part, Itewtoa told Halifax that Colonel Mason KacFatiane,
93, The First Lord of the Admiralty, Duff Cooper, had been urging mobilization
of the fleet for at least two weeks.
94 » British Documents. 575.
95, ibid., Telegram from Mel ifex (London) to Phipps (Paris) on September 27,
and accompanying editorial footnote, 575.
the Military Attache) in Prague, had said that the Czech frontier guard (not
military) were not impressive, but that the amy itself "made a good Impression
and displayed no lack of morale. ... He considers that [the Czech forces
J
have confidence in their cause, their leadership, and their equipment. Ho
thinks it not unlikely, if they have the moral support of knowing that they
possess powerful allies, even if these cannot immediately act on their be-
half, that they may render a good account of themselves."?0
With regard to Poland, I think it fair to say that what she did depended
largely upon the firmness of the Anglo-French position. During the Munich week,,
of course, Poland had one major thought in mind - seizure of "Polish" Teschen.
Whether or not cession of the disputed territory would have kept the Poles out
of the war had it begun at this time canjiot be proven. But two telegrams of
September 27 from Hans Adolf von Moltke, German Ambassador in Warsaw, are re-
vealing. In the first he said that Colonel Jaeef Back, Polish Foreign Minister,
"wants to keep Poland neutral", that he wants to gain his territorial claims with-
out giving the world any impression of "Polish dependency on Germany. "9? In
the second Moltke emphasized that there was "no question of" any Polish coopera-
tion with the Soviet Union "so long as the latter interferes in European affairs;
that was an irrefutable principle of Polish policy." He added that the Polish
impression was that the Rumanian view was much the same. 98 Had there been war
in 1938, then Poland would probably have taken neither side (at least at the
outset.)
.
96. Carman Documents . Telegram from Newton (Prague) to Halifax (London),
September 27.
97. Ibid . . To Foreign Ministry, 973-974.
98. Ibid., 982-933. (Italics mine)
.
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As for Rumania, alluded to above by Moltke, she had bean tremendously shaken
by the Anglo-French memorandum to Czechoslovakia (September 21) . The Mew York
Times reported on September 22nd.
"The whole Rumanian press condemns the Anglo-French plan to
partition Czechoslovakia, especially as it is believed here
that its acceptance will have wide repercussions on the
Rumanian situation.
"Newspapers point out the Central and Eastern Europe
are now shaken to their very foundations. Rumania had full
confidence In France's and Great Britain's loyalty and read-
iness to fulfill their treaty obligations, but now, to her
greet dismay, she is compelled to recognise that thoee two
powers may go back on their word in an hour of danger.
"A reorientation of Rumanian foreign policy Is en-
visaged generally."99
"Reorientation"' probably meant adopting a neutralist position, with the hope
that this would save her from destruction by Germany.
Regarding the American ettltude, above and beyond F.D.R. 's peace overture,
the German Ambassador in the United States, Dr. Hans Melnrich Dleckhoff , said
on the 27th:
"There is reason to assume. . .[that American Government j. . .
are doing everything to suppress the existing but decreasing
isolationist tendency among the American people, so that, when
the moment comes, the whole weight of the United Ststes can
be thrown into the scale on the side of Britain. I consider
it my duty to emphasise this very strongly."100
The observation is not conclusive, but interesting* On the other hand, the
Hew Yorft Times concluded on September 28 that Roosevelt would probably apply tke
Neutrality Law if there was a larger than "highly localized" conflict.101
Although Cordell Hull himself thought that neutrality would gain nothing for
99. Jj£ New York Times . Thursday, September 22, 1938, 5.
100. German Documents . Telegram to Foreign Ministry (Berlin), 981-982.
101. The Sew York Times . Wednesday, September 28, 1938, 1.
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the United States, his menoirs reveal that the isolationist element in Congress
was still very powerful in 193d, so strong that he dared not state publicly what
he really believed.102
On the night of the 27th Neville Chamberlain delivered a radio speech in
the depressed tones of one "who baa abandoned all hopes of peace. "103 Wheeler-
Bennett interprets it aa a "complete revelation of his whole attitude towards
the crisis." Zn it are statements regarding the horror of war and a determina-
tion to avoid it, greater sympathy for Germany than for Czechoslovakia, puz-
zlement at hitler's hatred of the Caeeha aa wall aa at Csach obstinacy, "con-
tinued and incomprehensible belief in Hitler's premises and the evident lack
of perception of the deeper Issues at stake . Mcwat describes the speech as
ana of despair.103 Duff Cooper notes that Chamberlain had not one good thing
to say for the Czechs and did not even mention Roosevelt's telegram, the "hard-
ening" of public opinion in Prance, or the 'Hardening" of world opinion. 106
Later that evening Chamberlain received a message from the German Chancel-
lor which may well have formed the basis of Chamberlain's speech the next day
as well as of the Munich agreement itself. The Prime Minister drafted a reply
without consulting anyone but Sir Horace Wilson. Mowat comments: "This was the
nadir of diplomacy » a personal deal between two men at the expense of a third
party: I car. give you all yos want without war and without delay."107
102. lfe£ Memoes Corde.ll Vol. I (New York. 1948). 587, 592.
103. Ciano's Hidden Diary . 1937-38 (Mew York. 1953) . 163. Hereafter cited at
Ciano Diary .
104. Wheeler-Bennett. Munich. 157 (italics mine)
.
105. Mowot, Briton. 615.
106. Cooper. Old Men Forget . 239-240.
107. Mowat, Britain . 615.
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In che meantime Chamberlain had been asking overtures to Mussolini to gat
the latter to serve ae mediator In the crisis and thereby stop Hitler short of
going to war - although Italy had made It perfectly clear that In the event of
a conflict she would be on the side of Germany. 1 **8 The proposed meting with
Mussolini "mediating" (forestalling war once again) was suitable to Bonnet who
had told Phipps "that we must continue to keep the ball rolling unremittingly
till October 1, so as to do everything humanly possible to avert e conflict
for which both our countries are undoubtedly ill -prepared."109 Barly in the
afternoon Chamberlain received gratifying news from the Carl of Perth in Rome:
"At Signer Mussolini's request Eerr Hitler has accepted to postpone mobiliza-
tion for twenty-four hours."110
The Clano version of the agreement puts the Chamberlain government in a
rather poor light. According to the Italian Foreign Minister, when Perth was
informed that Itsly sided with Germany: "His face quivers and his eyes are red."
When Mussolini accepted the Chamberlain proposal for a delay of twenty-four hours,
the Earl "bursts into a sobbing laugh and rushes off to his embassy."111 Al-
though this cannot be taken literally, there is probably considerable truth in
the account. At any rate^ the stage was then set for the Munich announcement,
for with the delay came the agreement to luld a four-power conference presided
over by Mussolini, the anuouaceraeui; was made that evening.
Neville Chamberlain's speech to Commons September 28, 1938, was one of the
108. The Karl of Perth stated that "Ciano (Foreign Minister) remarked that Italy's
Interests, honour, and pledged word required that she should side ac-
tively with and fully with Germany", British Documents , Telegram to
Halifax (London), September 28, 800.
*
109. Ibid . . Telegram to Halifax (London), Sept. 28, 571.
110. Ibid . . 371.
111. Clano Olarv . 165.
most dramatic la the history of that body and unprecedented in lta response,
la spent considerable tine reviewing events during the Czech crisis period,
emphasising those which secured between September 14 and 27. 112 Then ha came
to Hitler's letter which he had received at 10:30 p.m. the previous day. In
It Hitler had reaaaured him that German troops ware to be used only to preserve
order, chat the vote (plebiscite) would be free, and that he (Hitler) would
join (France, England, and Italy) in an international guarantee. Chamberlain
said:
"Those are all reassuring state/santa as far as they go,
and I have no hesitation in saying, after the personal
contact I had established with Hitler that I believe
he means what he says when he atatea that."113
This is a shameful statement; this is especially obvious when one remembers that
Hitler flagrantly tossed aside the Berchteagaden promises et the Godesberg Con-
ference.
Chamberlain continued, referring to his appeals to Hitler and Mussolini and
to the Fflhrer 's (apparent) resultant deeision to postpone mobilisation11^ for
twenty- four hours (Chamberlain had by then been speaking for approximately
115
eighty minutes)/ Then, at this appropriate point, he waa interrupted when
a message was handed to him. After a pause, he dramatically continued:
"I have now been informed by Herr Hitler that he invites me
to meet him tomorrow morning . . . . W* are all patriots, and
there can be no honorable Member of this House who did not
feel his heart leap that the crisis has been oace more post-
112. Great Britain. H.C. Deb.* 5s, cols. 14-24.
113. Ibid. . cols. 24-25.
114. "Mobilisation" must have meant "invasion"; Germany had been "mobilized"
for quite some time.
115 » Great Britain . H.C. Dab, 339, 5s, col. 14-24.
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poned to give us one* more an opportunity to try what reason
and good will and discussion will do to settle a problem which
is already within sight of settlement. Mr. Speaker, I cannot
say any more. I am sure that the House will be ready to release
me now to go and see what I can make of this last effort. "116
A member cried; "Thank God for the Prima Minister!" This "touched off a demon-
stration of mass hysteria which the Mother of Parliaments had never before wit-
nessed." - There were tears, cheers, and Order Papers flying in the air. 117
Gallacher, the Communist member, voiced the only negative opinion and was shouted
down, 118 Eden walked out, and Msaaryk Ml disbelieving. 119 Shortly thereafter,
In Halifax's room at the Foreign Office, the courageous Maaaryk allegedly said
to the Foreign Secretary and Prime Minister: '"If you have sacrificed my nation
to preserve the peace of the world, I will be the first to applaud you. But
if not, gentlemen, Cod help your souls.'"120
116. Wheel ar-Bennett, Munich . 170, end Great Britain . fi.C. 339 Paba 5s, col. 26.
117. Wheeler-Bennett, Munich. 170.
118. great Britain
. B.C. Debs 339 5s, col. 28.
119. Wheeler-Bennett, Munich , 170.
120. Ibid., 170-171.
VII. Musk^9 tWon
And The Czechoslovak Crisis
In Great Britain during the mid-30 'e popular sentiment agninet war grew
by leaps and bounds. An organization known as the Peaoe Pledge Union was
formed in 1934 and soon bo&stsd thousands of signatures - pledging that they
121
would nave nothing to do with war. On June 25, 1935* the famous Pease Ballot
was conducted under the sponsorship of a special organisation supported largely
by the liberal and Labor Parties j it resulted from the challenge of the Eth-
iopian crisis, and its aim was implementation of collective security measures
under the league of Nations. Although 6o% voted yea to a Question as to whether
122
or not they favored collective action to stop an aggressor nation (clause five),
123
a higher percentage voted for a general reduction of armaments. This was indica-
tive of the curious confusion of motivations and lack of realism which persist-
ed. Paradoxically it night seem, nmy believed that pacifism and appeasement
could be meshed with collective security under the league of Nations. But perhaps
this may be explained in part by the not often expressed but often felt argument
that collective action is individual irresponsibility - i.e., let the "other guy"
or the "group41 do it,
There were several major factors which made the situation all the more
confusing. Some Pritish newspapers simply sided with the National Socialist
movement in Germany, thereby helping to allay the British public' e fears of the
Third 3eich . On ^arch 25, 1935, William L. 3hirer recorded in his diary that "the
121. Alfred fs Kavighurst, Twentieth Century f»rHflto (Bvanston, 1962), 244.
Hereafter cited »» H«vij?hurst f A.T.TTVsntleth Century Britain,
122. Ibid.* 244.
123. Dalton, H., Memoirs . 16.
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Pally Hg&l* o * - through T,ord Rathowere, its owner, and Ward Price, its roving
correspondent - both pro-^asi - has become a wond*rfr.l Haal mouthpiece and
sounding board. . ."124 After Hitler had announced conscription . thereby vio-
lating the Versailles Treaty, B-3averbrook*3 Sisnday Exprass "warned against
threatening German? with force."125 And when Hitler's forcer, rs-occupiad the
Rhineland, Shirar aoted that the Observer and [Lord Rothenwte,' | J Sunday Dispatch
"are delighted at Hitler's wove."126
Adding to the psychology of the timer, were the raany important pacifist or-
ganii.itions in Britain. The soaeetfhafc twUlMWltri Quakers were dedicated to
r.He principle of non-rinr.istaace. 127 There ware also the intellectual radical
"actfists J ed by C.E.M. Jo.id and that perennial, ageless agitator for non -re-
sistance and disarmament: , Berftrand ®ussell. Their argument was that war did
not pay, that it defeated its own ends, and that it. was evil. Sy refusing to
fight,, they said,, people "could -save their own skin" and that of civilisation
itself. 128 There were other less iMportrj.it organisations, but the point is that
pacifism, whatever its various forme , had become a fioree to be reckoned with in
Britain of the mid-*30' s and therefore contributed to the appeasement psychology.
The people could not be expected to she*? concern over lack of Arms strength
if their leadership did not. An<? pnMNNMft policy s in the words of the Annual
124. William L. Shirer, Berlin friary (*•> York, 1961), 25. Hereafter died as
Shirar, V*i>. ( Diary.
125. Ibid .. March 17. 1935, 30.
126. Ibid . , Karch », 1936, 46.
127. Ronald Buchanan ,KcCaiium, Public Opinion and the. Last Peace (London, 1944),
174. Hereafter cited as McCallua, R.B., Public Opinion .
128« Ibid. , 177.
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Realster. was (In 1933) "'hesitant, indecisive, apologetic, content to drift,'"**'
No particular concern resulted from such events as the German Amy's re-occupa-
tion of the Rhineland.
In July, 1936, a group of eighteen conservatives, led by Wine ton Churchill,
appealed to Prime Minister Stanley Baldwin for Increased armaments, but they
were not taken seriously. 130 The prevailing attitude in the government and
among the people was that Versailles bad been a wrong and that it was in dire
n«ed of correction; therfore, very few favored preventive measures to counter
Germany's move in the Rhinel and
.
1 31 The British nation suffered from a Versailles
Treaty guilt complex, and it was thie sam* psycho] ogy which persisted when
Germany occupied Austrls and, to a lesser degree, when she coveted the Sudeten-
land. The Reich merely sought realization of the principle of self -determina-
tion; it would be wronfc to prevent her from pursuing this course. The British
guilt-complex over the Versailles decisions (especially the declaration for
self-determination) is not to be taken lightly in any analysis of this period.
However, opposition developed • at first imperceptibly,, then more noticeably,
And there were many Individuals in Fritaiu vho sought to convince others that Hit-
ler was using the self-determination principle as a pretext for conquest , that
he was nothing more than a blackmailer,. What they argued aet?aed to raak« semsc,
especially when one considers the manner in which Germany occupied Austria in
l-Sarch, 1930. On July 1 of that year Dr. Gilbert Murray wrote in Th« Spectator :
'Ve seek peace by international cciperation, not by sub-
mission to aggressors. . . . Continued submission tends
to stimulate both the contempt end the appetite of an ara-
129. Havighiirst, A. P., Twentieth Century ' rifcain, 25< .
130. Ibid .. 251.
131. Ibid., 251-252.
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bitious aggressor. . . .itvary loss of prestige by Ch« forces
of peace, ovary concession to blackmail, ovary betrayal
of trust through fear nakes war wore likely, not less
likely. "132
Others argued for preventive measures under the banner of the League of
Nations and revolved rauch favorable response, for example, a rally (July 6,
1936) for action against appeasement sponsored by e youth organisation filled
Barla Court Stadium with 10,000 people, while an estimated 5,000
were turned back at the gates. 133 Public opinion seemed to be awakening to
the Barman t:h>.iau.
On July 8 an interesting argument was presented by a Jerome Dessain (ege 26)
in The Spectator . In asking what we should fight for, he said that there were
no good material, moral, or defensive reasons - that pacifism ouaht to be right,
gut, be wrote, "You can't buy off a blackmailer. You can only increase his
lust and greed," and dictators "only respect force.
"
l3*
larly in September the Trades Union Congress met at Blackpool. While fi«"it-
i ci zing capitalism for its alleged evils, It also streesed Britain's duty to
the League of Nations and said that it was time for the Government's "acquies-
cence" to Fascism to cease. 135 In a declaration issued Septesihev ft, the Con-
gress stated that!
13*. The Spectator . London, July i, 193fc, "A Moral Basis Or Power Politics?"
by Or. Gilbert Hurray, 11.
133. Ibid .. 12.
134. The Spectator
.
London, July 8, 1938, 'Vhat Should We fight for?"
by J. Jerome Dessain, 58.
The Times . London, September 6, 1938, 7.
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"'The British Government oust Leave no doubt in eh* mind of
the German Government that they will unite with the
French and Soviet Governments to resist any attack on
Czechoslovakia.
. . .whatever the risks involved, Britain
must make its stand against aggression, there is now no
room for doubt or hesitation. iOur staple slogan is]
Stand by the Csechs.""l36
The President of the Congress, Herbert H. Slvin, pointed out that appeasement
had resulted in the fall of Abyssinia, stalemate in Spain, and Anschluss in
Austria; Czechoslovakia seems to be next, he seid. And he earned that this might
be Europe's last chance to check the advance of Sfaai Germany. 1 -*7
In September The Times continued to support the Government's view-point
to the letter in ita editorials. In fact, it is impossible to find one word
of criticism relating to the policies of Neville Chamberlain. This may be
explained in a large measure by the fact that its editor, Geoffrey Dawson, was
a member of the Prime Minister's "inner circle", and that he had "special" sources
of information. Hence, The Times was reputed to be the "'honorary instrument
of British policy."* Oawsea was pro-German and anti-French^%s editorials
cleerly attest to this.
For example, when it was announced that Chamberlain would meet with Hitler
at Berchtesgadea on September 15, The Times emphasised the relief expressed by
French opinion in response to the Chamberlain mission1 -19 - implying that France
really wanted to appease Hitler. And the cheers for Chamberlain at his departure
from London for Berchtesgaden ahovad, according to this publication, a "universal
136. Dalton, H. , Memoirs . 174-175.
137. Jhe Times Weekly Edition , London, September 8, 1938, 8.
133. Havighurst, A.F., Twentieth Century Britain . 266. (along with kotheruore
of the Pally Mail and Garvin of the Observer) .
139. The Times . London, September 15, 193?, 9.
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gratitude for what he had dona.
. . . [He had J earned for Graat Britain a ti-
tle to be called the sleepless sentinel of liberty and peace. "1*0
On September 22, The, Times Justified the beginnings of what enounced to
a sacrifice of Czechoslovakia as follows:
"The hopes of those who laid these [Anglo- French j proposals
[of September 19] before the Csech Government will certainly
be that they would leave Czechoslovakia, though smaller in
size, stronger by being tsade more nearly homogeneous."
further, the union of Sudatenlanders to Germany would conform with racial prin-
ciple and with that of self-determination.
"To the vast bulk of his countrymen, and to many millions out-
side this country, Mr. Chamberlain's bold move in going to
have a talk with Herr Hitler about the present troubles of
Europe came as water in the wilderness and as another proof
of his courage and his common cense."
The Czechs should give in for the good of all , eaid The Times .
"It la emphatically possible for the Csech lepublic to main-
tain for itself a strong, honorable, and secure position in
Central Europe. . . »
The Times also criticised the ideas of Winston Churchill, implying that he might
damage what it thought to be the only path to a peaceful Europe: "progress by
n&itual concession.
la the meantime, the opposition was making Itself heard more often and
more emphatically. Anthony Eden, the forgotten member of the original Chamber-
lain administration, spoke out in favor of standing up to Germany. He argued
that "if appeasement as to mean what it says, it must not be st the expense ef
140. Ibid . . 11.
141. The Times Weekly Edition . Loudon, September 22, 193S, 4.
142. The Times
.
London, September 13« 19J3, li. Actually there was no such
thing as "mutual concession". The only reel concessions were made
by the allies during the Csech crisis period.
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our national reputation, or of our sense of fair dealing", that appeasement will
ba "neither real nor lasting at auch a price. "143
1« 2b£ ffP»a«tq,g on September 23, Oven Berfield wrote: "1 am still sub-
bing my eyes, as X am one of those mho had retained the belief that there were
depths below which this country would not sink. Z now sse that the abyss is
bottomless."14* In the same Issue this publication noted: "Opinion in this
country will be -aW*^ U- split in two, and by no means only on party lines."1*5
In a telegram to the British delegation at Codesberg, Halifax said (Sept-
ember 23) that the mass of public opinion was hardening - "While mistrustful of
our plan (Anglo-French plan of September 19} but prepared perhaps to accept it
with reluctance as an alternative to war." He said further that Britain had
"gone the limit of concession."1*0 The very fact that Halifax would admit this
much is significant, considering the position he held in the Chamberlain Govern-
ment.
On September 21, Winston Churchill demanded the recall of Parliament, arguing
that: "The menace ... .Is not to Czechoslovakia but to the cause of freedom
and democracy in every country. m1*7 And the General Committee of the Manchester
Liberal Federation passed a resolution for the immediate assembly of Parliament
sad the resignation of the government as a result of its "abject and absolute
surrender" at Codesberg.
143. The Times . London, September 22, 1938, IS.
144. The Spectator . London, September 23, 1938, 428.
145. Ibid . . 469.
146. British Documents . September 23, 1936, 490.
147. The Manchester Guardian
.
September 22, 1938, 4.
14-rt. Ibid . . September 23, 1938, 11.
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On September 24. The New Statesman and. Mation published a acathlng indict-
ment of Chamberlain's policies entitled, "The Surrender To Hitler". Bsrchtes-
gaden Is spoken of aa a peace without honor or security; France and Britain
are held responsible for the betrayal of Chechoslovakia. Although Hitler talks
of "the right of self-determination," it continues,, "[Chamberlain J should not
think that the natter will stop here. ... The wealthy landlord has never
gotten off with one payment to the blackmailer. But next time the money may be
paid not in Czech but in British currency." This publication advocated the
overthrow of Chamberlain in the "next fortnight"; for, although Czechoslovakia
could no longer be saved, Britain might be. 1*-
It is difficult to gauge the influence of newpapers on British public opin-
ion. It l£ clear that The. Times , the Observer , and the Pailv Mail usually par-
roted Government policy; it is also clear that there were editors and writers
who took the side of the opposition - and printed this side of the story. But
how many amongst the masses are guided by editorials? This is one of the impon-
derables in a caae such aa this. And, by the same token, newspapers certainly
cannot be relied upon as barometers of public opinion; bear In mind, for example,
the unique role of Dawson of The Times.
A telegram from the Acting Counselor of the Carman Embassy In Great Britain
(Balsam) to the German Foreign Ministry is another, perhaps more accurate , source
of insight into the mood of public opinion during the Munich week. Salzata aald
that although the British public's reaction to Berchtesgaden waa "characteristic
of the reaction produced In Brltiah public opinion by his bold decision", dis-
trust developed on the eve of Godesberg - particularly as a result of exaggerated
Gorman press and radio propaganda against Czechoslovakia. He continued:
149. The Mew Statesman and. SatIon. September 24, 1938, 444-445.
/
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"Th« distrust of the aim of our policy, Which up to now
could be noted latently and vaguely here and there, and
which found expression la the speeches of Bden, Churchill,
and AtClee, as well as in the resolutions passed by the
Labor Party and the trade-unions, gained ground everywhere .
It extended to aU circles of £ha population without excep-
tion, when on the 23rd Instant the news came that the God-
eaberg talks would not now be continued. "150
The implication waa clear; a Carman waa warning Germany that she had better
exercize care, for Britain might fight after all.
Letters to the editors of newspapers ere another possible barometer of
public opinion. And em September 23 the gew York Times noted that spontaneous
letters of indignation (regarding government policy) were flooding British news-
paper offices. 151 On the 22nd Jjje Manchester Guardian published a letter writ-
tea by an B.l. Tawreye which Included the observation that "The ambition to be
eaten lest, which inspires our present policy, la intelligible but futile; we
shall (if we remain edible) be eaten all the sane, nor shall we be cousel ted
aa to the date of the ceremony."13,2 The same iasue Included a letter from C.
Del isle Burns, the theme of which waa that there were "limits" to the realise-
tlon of the aelf-determination principle. 153 Letters to Tjje Guardian on the
23rd included one from a former British resident in Germany appealing to the
British not to succumb to blackmail and a letter from Briar MaeHurrough blasting
British leadership, including that of the (minority) Labor Party. 15 ** A letter
150. Carman Documents, 919-920 (Italics mine).
151. The Hew York Times . September 23, 1938, 6.
152. The Manchester Guardian. September 22, 1938, 20.
153. Ibid
.
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to 2b« iMrtfal published on Che 26th claimed that the long-tern effect of
Chamberlain'a policy would be to make Britain Germany's vassal. 155
There were also a lesser number of letters supporting Clumberlain, such
as one from Len Harding which noted that Chamberlain had had the foresight to
avoid the mistakes of the past - that he was the only one to seek new solutionsA»
But the important thing is that toere was a sizeable amount of written protest
from the public.
Several other factors may be noted as further evidence of the change which
was taking place. On September 22 the Archbishop of York characterised appease-
ment as a morally calamitous procesfi w "157 Kany organisations
,
including the
Woman's International League, the South Manchester Peace Council, the League
of Nations Union Youth Groups, 158 the National Union of Railwaymenj the Associ-
ation of Women Clerks and Secretaries, and the Council of Minstry of Health
Branch of the Civil Servic Clerical Association, 159 protested against the
government's policy and demanded that Czechoslovakia not be abandoned. All of
this led The New York Times to speak of the . . grim desire of the British
masses. . .that the long series of refcreatB of the National government before
the dictatorships be terminated once and for all", and to state that, "this
desire has become, most pronounced in the past week. It. is due to hutailiation
over recent events, and it is due to growth of the conviction that there can
be no peace, that no settled prosperity is possible until Europe is freed from
155. Ibid . . Monday, September 26, 1933, 16.
156. Ibid .. 16.
157. The Manchester Guardian
,
September 23, 1938, 12.
158. Ibid . . September 22, 1938, 4.
159. Ibid . . September 24, 1938, 17.
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the wmci of Hui extremism"; and the sooner the showdown came, the better. 160
Howat says in no uncertain tens that there was a definite "hardening" of
British public opinion after September 19 caalnat Chamberlain's willingness to
sacrifice Czechoslovakia in the course of peace, The public, he says f was
bewildered, for it was not kept well informed by the press or B.B.C. as a re-
sult of Chamberleln's "secretive diplomacy"; and Parliament was not in session.
But the people felt badly for the Czechs. On Sunday, September 25, even Garvin
argued in the Observe? for & strong stand, as did the Daily Telegraph on the 26th. 161
On September 26th a aeries of speeches were given at Saris Court by Labor
Party members of Parliament. "'Stand by the Czechs?'" was the popular cry. Hugh
Balton writes: "Our audience rose to it, and so, I believe, would the great
mass of British opinion have done, had the bugle blown."162
September 27 was the third or fourth day in the high point of opposition
to Chamberlain's policy in Britain, and Mi. speech undoubtedly underlined the
feeling. But the dramatic Munich announcement on September 28,
referred to earlier, changed most of this. Public opinion was once again
in the palm of Chamberlain's ham*. A Lon<l>n %fcsaa edicoxial on the 29th spoke of
Utt glowing response to Chamberlain's speech of his great succi^-j where la a
parallel situation in 1914 Sire Sdward Grey, British Foreign Minister, had failed
to preserve the peace. 16"* When the results of the Munich Conference wwee made
fcnown, The Times referred to the agreement as "a laaniSasS improvement on the
160. £be. IJew ^ork Times , September 28, 1938, 14.
161. Mowat, C.L., Britain . 613.
162. Dal ton, H« Memoirs . 175. The implication is chat other leadership could
easily have swung Britain in favor of collective security and stand-
ing !>y the Czechs.
163. She Times . London, September 29, 1938, 13.
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Godesberg memorandum'.'164 With war temporarily avert.*, the people ware content
to l«t the Prime Minister handle the situation as beat he could. The majority
applauded the announcement of the conference, applauded when the Prime Minister
left for Germany, and lauded his "triumphal" return*
At XSB8& SaSfeil. tdition &>r Octobei 6 featured a front
-pas* photograph
with the caption: "Chamberlain
. . .on his return from the successful Munich
Conference." The edition speaks of his "noble" efforts and of how the House of
Ccneons had been stirred to a "passionate relief". It also claimed, with little
exaggeration, 'London gave the Prime Minister the welcome of a conquering hero
on hia return from Munich late on Friday. The King congratulated Chamberlain,
and the crowd outside chanted: "We want Hevillel"165
Taking j£he Times' bias into account,. Chamberlain did go to Munich with a
fairly clear popular mandate for the policy of appeasement. At least several
major answers for this may be found, including a simple, understandable dread of
war and an "uncritical admiration of Nasi Germany by members of the upper class,
such as Lord Londonderry." 1-66 But much insight into the problem may be found
in a latter to the editors of The Spectator on September 30. The author is
twenty-one-year -old U.S. Ryder. Me stated frankly that the British were "not
prepared to fight and die- for collective security" because (1) there was an ele-
ment of "right" (self-determination) in the German demands and (2) Britain was
afraid to make final ccaoltmenta in Eastern Europe. His generation, Ryder main-
tained, was not prepared to fight for territories In Eastern and Central Europe
that contain * big and discontented minorities." Regarding British policy in the
164. Ibid . . «riday, September 30, 1938, 12.
165. The Times Weekly Edition . London, Oceober 6, 1938, 1,3.
166. Mowat, C.L., Britain . 591.
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30's he was very critical. Policy had fluctuated continually since 1931 -
changing according to what ha referred to as the "behindhand" feelings of the
people and la the face of threats from other nations. Chamberlain was always
ague; if he would clearly pledge to defend [rump] Czechoslovakia, said Ryder,
"then, I believe, Mr. Chamberlain would have the main backing of public opinion."^?
Mowat concludes that "... .until after Munich there tas no question that
appeasement was popular, despite its many critics. "168 However, there were
"many critics", and their numbers multiplied rapidly during the Munich week, In
spite of the fact that the leadership hac certainly made no attempt to rally
them to Che support of the Czechs „ in thai; there was this "hardening" of opinion
in Britain* it is quite possible that different leadership might well have
gained the general support of Che public in initiating a new stand-firm policy.
This projection is certainly reasonable in that the "hardening" of public spin-
ion between September 22 and 25th sannot be disputed. As it was, vh^n Chaaber-
lain offered an anxious nation & new chaaca for peace (September 28), it was
only human nature that they should jump at the chance and give hias their moral
support. The general public simply did ,.ot know any better; the Prlaie MMMI
had never told them of the underlying issues at stakes, even if he himself
secretly recognised their existence.
167. The Spectator . London, September 30, 1938, Letter to Editors from R.S.
8ydf:r, 517.
168. Mowat, C.L., Britain , 591.
As early as 1937, Seville Henderson made It clear that he favored handing
the Sudetenlaad to Germany since it was, in his view, rightfully hers. 169
This sane Henderson was Neville Chamberlain's hand-picked successor to
Sir Brie Phipps for British Ambassador to Berlin in 1938. Phipps was trans-
ferred to the leee Important Paris office, not because he was incapable of hand-
ling the Berlin assignment, but probably because Henderson was (according to
Wheeler-Bennett, Cooper and others) more amenable to the German point of view
and therefore mora necessary to the success of appeasement than was Phipps.
This cannot be proved, but the transfer was implemented. Let us givs the
record a quick glance.
In a letter to Sir Horace Wilson from Nuremberg on September 9, 1938, Hen-
derson said:
"Versailles was the error which has got to be corrected.
Much as I hate saying so, that is the hard fact. Other-
wise we must fight Germany again. It is revision by wer
or revision by peaceful negotiations which in fact means
compulsion, ajfc Prexue and not Berlin, because compulsion
here settles nothing."1 70
In s letter to Halifax on the 20th, he said that he
".
. .would rather have local trouble between Csechs and
Germans than a world war. . . .It may be humiliating, but
it's better to keep the peace for a principle than to
fight a war in opposition to one. And I have no doubt
whatever of the rightnees of the principle pure and simple.
Anyway new that we have token the plunge for self-determin-
ation we have got to see it through, and if Bones is reason-
able, do the beat we can for aim. "171
169.
170.
in.
Cooper, D.
,
0£d Men. forget. 225.
British Documents. Appendix, 648. (Italics mine).
ibid., Bpp. , 655.
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During the Munich weak he said to Halifax: "Any encouragement given to
the Csecha to hesitate or prevaricate will he disastrous and only Immediate
surrender of territories which they have agreed ultimately to surrender can
save them from complete tragedy. "172 xh« only answer to the problem short of
war, he maintained, was acquiescence to the German demands, and this included
the Godesberg memorandum. Re added fuel to his argument with reports such
M tfti*.
"Military Attach* has just returned from Czechoslovakia
and is convinced that morale is poor and that resistance
will prove to be feeble. This must be known to the
French too and to the Czech General Staff as it is clearly
known here. "173
His answer to the honor position expressed by such people as Jan Masaryk, Chur-
chill, and DaIton was this twisting of the word.
"X told [Czech Charge d'Affaires ! that X thought it was
. . . with honour and that nothing could be more honour-
able than for M. Banes to announce to the world that he
preferred to yield to overwhelming force than ... a
war which would ruin his own country and might ruin the
whole of Europe. "174
Early on the 28th he told Halifax that by mid-day Czechoslovakia should be
informed that if Banes does not (yield to German demands) we shall mot support
him, "and that Britain would lose more prestige by ineffectual military efforts
to stop Germany than by giving Hitler what he wanted. And in this case, Hender-
son said, "no compromise" was possible. 175
172. British Documents . Telegram, September 25, 1938, from Berlin, 51 i.
173. Ibid.. Telegram from Henderson (Berlin) to Halifax (London), September 26,
1938, 563.
174. Ibid.. Telegram Henderson (Berlin) to Halifax (London), September 27, 1938, 579.
175. Ibid .. September 28, 1938, 535-586.
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Such commentary could not help but reaffirm Chamberlain's belief that
his policy was feasible, desirable, and necessary - that its course should
not be changed. In this way Neville Henderson contributed to the Munich re-
sults. It must also be noted that the pro-German slant of the views of this
man referred to by Duff Cooper es "the Hysterical Henderson"176 efforded the
British absolutely nothing in the line of concession from Hitler; and it cer-
tainly contributed to the destruction of the territorial integrity of Czecho-
slovakia.
The selections from his correspondence are also Interesting in that they
are e clear reflection of the Chamberlain-sponsored appeasement attitude. The
author was Neville Henderson, but he might easily have been Wilson or Chamber-
lain himself.
176. Cooper, 9., Qld Haj forget. 226-227.
IX. ffla Munich SsslSXfBIt*
When It wu announced that the Pour Powers would aeet at Munich, Bene*
lastedlately hogged Chamberlain not to do anything that would place Czechoslo-
vakia In a worse position than she would be In were the Anglo-French proposals
implemented; he warned of the implications behind Polish threats and asked
that Czechoslovakia be allowed to present her case at Munich. 177 However, no
pert of thle eppeel wes granted consideretIon; the Csech representatives welted
In en anteroom at Munich and were simply issued e diktat at the conclusion of
the conversations. Russia waa not invited to participate in any way; this
would have been unacceptable to Germany. The principals were Germany, Britain,
Prance end Italy, with Mussolini acting ae mediator.
Count Dine Grand** Italian Ambassador in Britain, expressed his opinion,
"that it would have been impossible for Signer Mussolini to have persuaded
Hitler to hold up mobilization and agree to a conference if he bed not pre-
viously given Germany full assuraace of military support." The Italian nation,
he added, wee not happy with the prospect of war.178
Ciano provides this brief account. At the beginning of the conference,
the Ducc went to a corner of the room where he wee surrounded by Nazi leedere.
"There was a vague sense of caberaesment , particulary on the pert of the French."
Shortly thereafter, the minor participants - German Foreign Minister Rlbbentrop,
177. British ^imnntT Telegram from Hewton (Prague) to Halifax (London),
September 28, 1938, 604.
178. Ibid., Telegraa from Halifax (London) to Earl of Perth (Heme)
September 29, 1938, 626.
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Alexis Ldger (Secretory General of the French Foreign Office), Sir Horace Wil-
son, Scheldt (the German Interpreter) , and Ciano - discussed the situation In
general terns. Then Hitler, Chamberlain, Deledler, and Mussolini got down to
business. Ciano continues, "Chaneerlaln la inclined to linger over legal point*;
Oaladler defends the cause of the Csechs without much conviction; the Duce
prefers to renaln silent and sua up and draw conclusions when the others have
finished their dissertations." In the afternoon, according to Ciano, Daladlar
said that the while problem waa due to the p« g-heedcdness of Bones and that he
had repeatedly suggested that the Sudeten Germans he given autonomy. These
"observations" are biased and my not be too accurate. Nonetheless, it la true
that it did not take long for the four leaders to come to an agreement.
The terms of the Munich agreement, formulated and concluded by evening
on the 29th, may be listed (in somewhat ebbreviated form) as follows:
(1) Evacuation begun by 1 October.
(2) Evacuation concluded by 10 October - no destruction of
Installations (Czech Government to be held responsible
for this).
(3) Evacuation under control of International commission (re-
presented by Germany, Britain , France, Italy, and Czechoslovakis.)
(4) Schedule for evacuation of various areas.
(5) International Commission to determine territories in
which a plebiscite is to be held. Occupation by Inter-
national bodies until after plebiscite. Commission to
sst date for plebiscite - not later then end of November.
(6) International Commission to render final decision on
frontiers. Commission may also "recommend to the four
Powers - Germany, the United Kingdom, Franca and Italy -
in certain exceptional cases minor modifications in the
strictly ethnographical determination of the zones which
are to be transferred without plebiscite."
(7) Six months' right of option "into end out of transferred
territories."
(8) Within four weeks - Sudeten Germans who wish it will be re-
leased from military or police service in Czechoslovakia and
Sudeten German political prlsonecs will be released by Czech Government.
179. Ciano, Plarv . 166-167.
ANNEX: Anglo-French guarantee of new borders of Czecho-
slovakia. German-Italian guarantee of sane to go in-
to effect "When the question of Polish and Hungarian
minorities in Czechoslovakia has bean settled." New
meeting if latter question not resolved within three
months.
"All questions which may arise out of the transfer of
the territories shall he considered as coming within
the terms of reference of the international commission.
"The Four heads of Governments here present agree that
the international commission provided for in the agree-
ment signed by then today shall consist of the Secretary
of State in the German Foreign Office, the British, French,
and Italian Ambassadors accredited In Berlin, and a re-
presentative to be nominated by the Government of Czecho-
slovakia. "ISO
Munich legalised the cession of 11,000 square miles of territory, 2,800,000
Sudeten Germans, and 800,000 Czechs. 181 Chamberlain was to say with satisfac-
tion that he gained a negotiated settlement which was more moderate that Hitler's
Godesberg demands. Hitler's supposed "concessions" at Munich included: (1) Pro-
vision for a Czech representative at the International Commission at Berlin with
•quel voting power with those representatives of the Pour Powers, (2) the "ex-
ceptional cases" ruling - point 6, and (3) the further concession in the right
of option and the transfer of populations. But were there really any concessions
on Hitler's part?
The Godesberg "Memorandum", substituted for the Berchtesgaden resolutions
in part because Hungarian and Polish minorities would not be thereby relieved
of distrees, demanded that Hungarian and Polish claims be met as a requisite to
a peaceful solution. The "Annex" to the Munich agreement granted Hungary and
Poland the right to take the territories which they claimed. Secondly, the God-
180. British Documents. Telegraphic, Text of Munich Agreement, September 29,
1938. Germany, United Kingdom, France, and Italy, received Sept. 30, 627-829.
181. Wheeler-Bennett, J.W., Munich. 194.
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eaberg demand that German-speaking regions be "ceded forthwith" was hardly
modified at Munich since all areas to be ceded vera to be evacuated within
eleven days; s Oodeeberg decision would have given the Csechs approximately
seven or eight days to evacuate (depending upon the day which the memorandum
night have gene into effect). Thirdly, Hitler's original demand that military
and economic establishments la the areas evacuated be left intact w&s granted
by the terms of the Munich settlement. Fourthly, at Godesbcrg the FBhrer had
warned that the Csechs might give in with the Czech-German frontier settled on
a national basis or not give In, in which case lltler would force the construc-
tion of a strategic frontier. Munich granted Hitler both, since the Czech forti-
fications system, as strong as the French Maginot Line, waa handed over to Ger-
many. Fifth, at Godesbcrg Hitler had been unwilling to guarantee the now Csech
boundaries against unprovoked aggression; at Munich, in the "Supplementary De-
claration", he and Mussolini "conceded" to guarantee "rump" Czechoslovakia after
Hungary end Poland had bitten off the chunks which they coveted. This was en
easy conaesslon, for there would be very little left to guarantee and because
no one could really hold Hitler to ft:.
It is difficult to draw any real distinction between the Godesbcrg "memor-
andum** of September 24 and the Munich agreement of September 30. In actuality
the trials and anxieties of the "Munich Week" resulted in nothing different than
what might have been conceded on September 23rd or 24th. It prompted Andre
Francois-Poncet, French Ambassador la Berlin, to say: "' TttU Tffifff \f Frrn~r
l£fti££ Hi miff *m*f ask hik M&isat fi4«U*''"182
Without conceding anything significant, according to Wheeler-Bennett, Hit-
ler hereby destroyed the French system of security, drove Russia ou& g£ the
182. Clano, Diary . 163
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European al Ligament, and Isolated Poland.183
Although Duff Cooper registered contempt for the Munich decision and re-
signed his position, the rest of the Chamberlain Government reservedly lauded
Chamberlain's "success". According to The. Times , the people were overjoyed?
"They [the British people] were a demonstration of thankfulness
[appreciated the fact] that reason, backed by rapid action
and determination, had removed an issue upon which the
British people had shown Itself rightly and unhesitatingly
prepared to fight. "18*
Tha Hew York Tftrfr reported that the reaction was merely one of understandable
relief. 18' Mowat writes that Chamberlain was "deluged with letters of praise
from people at home and abroad" - those in England Including the King, General
Smuts, and the kitchen-maid if the Chamberlain family. 186
Not all were joyful over what had transpired. Many of the British people
were skeptical. Daladler felt guilt and despair - and his faee showed it when
he arrived in Paris after the conference, ln4plte of the fine welcome which
was granted him at the airport. When the Czech troops on the Creek Msglnot Line
"were ordered to retreat without fighting, many sulcidss resulted among the un-
happy ranks."187 And George P. Keanan, who was in Prague on the day of Munich,
says: "I shell never forget the sight of the people weeping in the streets as
the news of what had occurred came in over the loud-speakers."188 Of Chamberlain
Winston Churchill said at the time of Munich:
"'In the depths of that dusty soul there is nothing but abject
surrender. . .the Government had to choose between war and
shame. They chose shame, and they will get war, too.'"18'
183. Wheeler-Bennett, J.W., Munich . 177. Italics Mine - Russia slowly gravitated
toward Germany after Munich.
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Munieh t 1938 - Conclusions
Twenty-four years have elapsed since Munich, and it may be argued that it
is not entirely fair for this generation to stand in judgment of Neville Chamber-
lain's policies. We look back and make value Judgments in retrospect; he had
to utilize foresight, a very scarce commodity indeed. However, this is not reason
enough to acquit him of responsibility for what constituted a tremendous foreign
policy failure.
In m estimation certain almost irrefutable things may be said about Munich
and the week which preceded it - evidence* if you will, of Chamberlain's failure
to rise to the occasion and meet the problams successfully on behalf of Western
Europe. let us consider the more important points I have sought to bring to
light in this analysis.
(1) The question of preparedness, dealt with rather briefly here, is probably
the most complex problem at hand and not one which may be easily resolved. But
obviously prestige and military strength greatly enhance a nation's position at
the conference table. And obviously Britain alone had little of either in 1?3#.
This weakness is attributable not only to the 3aldwin Government and the Labor
190
Party which "rejected rearmament though advocating collective security" during t>e
Chamberlain and Baldwin eras, but also to Neville Chamberlain himself. As was
mentioned earlier, the Prime Minister never shewed any dissatisfaction with the
rearmament program until September, 1933, end then relatively little.
A Conservative minority, led by Winston Churchill, had urged preparedness
beginning at least as early as 1934} but this was a very small minority with an
ISO, Havighurst, A J., Twentieth Century, Britain, 253
equally small voice in policy-making. The Chamberlain Government must accept
Its share of the criticism om this score since it had no clear policy and since
It showed little anxiety over military strides In Germany and Italy, Military
measures were passed as early as 1935, but *'. . . not until the spring of 1939
did preparedness for war become the avowed Intention of rearmament. "191 As a
result the British Army had only five (defensive) divisions until the spring of
1939. This "fact" of 1938 would seem to stand as a very good reason for ap-
peasement at Munich.
However, the Germane were also weak In many respects. In September, 1938,
they had only 13 divisions in the West,192 whereas tha Trench had upwards of 60
divisions. Czech forces equaling at least 32 divisions and her formidable de-
fenses were available in 1938; they were gone in 1939. Germany was dearly su-
perior to Britain and France in air power, but in 1933 aha pecaeased neither the
bomber strength not the bases in Western Europe necessary for successful bombing
operations againat Britain.
The question as to whether or not Britain should have fought in 1933 rather
than 1939 is academic; but it does eeem that Britain would have done no worse
bad she dene so.
It has been argued that Chamberlain was stalling in 1938 to gain tine. The
facte rule otherwise because appeasement and complacency continued for acme months
after Munich. Ant even if it had really been his Intention to delay the issue
through appeeaement, he did not gain time (in terms of relative arma strengths)
anyway. Ou this issue High Dalton wrote: '"Taking all into account, I have llt-
191. Ibid . . 277.
192. Dal ton, H. , Memoirs . 205.
tie doubt that we lost a precious year."193
There ic another, perhaps more important, consideration here. The Anglo-
trench Conversations in Septenber revealed little British concern over relative
etna strengths. Although It mist he conceded that some feelings, fear* f and
motivations do not always manifest themselves in written documents, the follow-
ing indietenant by McCallum is perceptive:
"What degree of armament would have been sufficient to make
them (Prance and Britain) act? How many more ships, tanks,
and aeroplanes did they require before they could approve of
Great Britain's entangling herself in the obligations which the
Covenant of ttvi League implied? Would an Increase of thirty,
of sixty, of a hundred percent have bens enough, or is it pos-
sible that contempt and misunderstanding of the league system
was so deep that they would never have moved at all? M194
It is very likely that they would not have, so convinced was Neville Chamberlain
that the only way to peace on the Continent of Europe was through the appease-
ment of Reel Germany.
In September t, 1933, as before, Hitler acted with full confidence, not so
much that Germany was much stronger militarily than the Allies, but that the
latter did not have the will to react. He was willing "to play [then] a game
which [would! inevitably have [had] to be played one day."195 The British were not.
(2) Bom* British historians attempt to burden Prance with the responsibility
for the loss of honor from Bcrehtesgaden to Munich. A. J.P. Teylor is a prominent
example; he claims that France's loss of fibre led to the "decline of morality'
at Bcrehtesgaden, that Britain later (at Godesberg and Munich) became trapped
by French insistence on a guarantee (of the new borders of Chechoslovakia) , that
Daladler thereby gave Great Britain the push "which landed her in the Second
193. Ibid . . 204.
194. McCellum, B.B., Public Opinion . 189. (Italics mine).
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World Wsr."196
But It wist bo remembered that Chamberlain wis almost slngle-handadly de-
termining British-French policy in 1938 (partially, it is true, because France
bad "lost fibre"), especially daring the September tri-Conference period. Da-
ladier had chosen to play the role of follower; and although he Blight argue
with Chamberlain (as he did at the British-French meetings following Berchhs-
gaden and Sedeeberg), he always gave in sooner or later. The Taylor assertion
therefore seems ill-founded.
The implication that Great Britain was committed to Eastern Europe and ul-
timately war simply because she guaranteed Csech borders is open to considerable
debate. Firstly, Britain never lived up to her guarantee; she actually entered
the war on behalf of Poland, whom she pledged to protect nearly a year later.
Secondly, it may be argued that Britain, the prey of the blackmailer, would
probably eventually come Into violent conflict with that blackmailer, regardless
of commitments to Eastern Europe, that it was only a question of time and place.
0) What is probably most dubious in Neville Chamberlain's conduct of foreign
policy during the waech crisis period culminating in the Munich decision is his
absolutely dogmatic insistence, to the very end, upon the very letter of hie ap-
peasement policy and his unwillingness to consider or to explore alternative pro-
cedures or policies. Be had made up his mind, and nothing could change it. Even
after Codesberg, where hitler made a lie of Berchteegadea* Chamberlain publicly
reaffirmed his belief that Hitler was a "nan of his word." In this regard, con-
sider two major possibilities which might have been exploited:
(a) As we have seen, on August 18, 1933, Kerr von Klelst was granted in-
terviews with Vanslttart, Lloyd George, and Churchill; he mode it plain to ell
196. Teylor, A.J.P., Origins . 175-177.
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that the German officer- class was unqualifiedly opposes to war but that it
needed help from the outside (Britain) if it was to be able to foil Hitler. His
suggestions were summarily brushed aside by the British Prime Minister.
This is revealing on two counts. In the first plscs it shows the apparent
pro-Hitler slant of British policy in that Chamberlain bad immediately "sided"
with the Whxer agalns fen Kleistt he trusted Hitler more than he did the latter.
Secondly, it edde fuel to the allegation that Chamberlain would not even consider
new proposals.
Other Germans at the time lent support to Von Klcist's statements regarding
the internal situation in the Reich. Years later evidence of an army plot against
the Basil Leadership was bared, proving that there was s strong opposition factor
ready to act. Chamberlain could not be expected to have known of the specifies
in 1938; but he had more than an inkling of what waa afnof and simply brushed
the opportunity aside. He wanted no part of "Jacobites" and dared not deviate
from the appeasement path.
(b) As was the case witlT the Von Xleist effort, Chamberlain turned deaf eare
on pleas emanating from Litvinov and Maisky for collective action involving cooper-
ation with the Soviet Onion. Dalton says that "it was not clever to cold-shoulder
the Russians in order to curry favor with the Germane." This is s supportable
objection. Although the purges In Russia and the menace of Bolshevism were
legitimate grounds for preceding cautiously in dealing with the Soviet Union,
they were not substantial enough to warrant Russia no consideration et all from
Chamberlain, especially in view of the consistency with which Litvinov had main-
tained his position. Chamberlain would not even confer with the Russians. He
would not even think of causing Hitler distress by talking with Russian represent-
197. Dal ton, H. , Memoirs. 193.
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atIves; and this My have bean a serious mistake, for evidence or rumors of
Anglo-Russian intrigue might well have caused Hitler to modify his demands. But
this is simply conjecture. The canoes of this policy may be seen in the Nazi-
*ovist Pact of 1939. What is important and obvious again here is Chamberlain's
desire to placate Hitler in every way possible and his unwillingness to deviate
from his previously-set course. — whatever the perils and whatever the potent-
ialities offered by an policy shift.
(4) Many proponents of appeasement and many who simply saw no other alterna-
tive to appeasement argued that great Britain had nothing to gain by going to
war in 1938. I have already attempted to show that the lack of clear policy left
the British people so confused that it was no wonder that they expressed little
desire to fight for Czechoslovakia. What waa not made clear (and was probably
not even seen) by the Chamberlein Government was that it was not really for
Czechoslovakia that Britain and France should have fought in 1938. John W.
Wheeler-Bennett gets at the root of the issue when he insists that fighting
would not have boon for Czechoslovakia in 1938 and was not for Poland in 1939 -
but rather for a principle of far-reaching implications. This concept is ex-
pressed by Duff Cooper:
"'In defense of this principle we have fought many times in
the past and must be prepared to fight again in the future,
for on the day when we are not prepered to fight for it we shall
have forfeited our liberties, our independence, and all the hopes
end Ideals which we have ever cherished. '"198
The British and French, says Wheeler-Bennett, could not make up their minds as
to what their "vital interests" really were.
198. Wheeler-Bennett, J.W., Munich . 7.
MThey did not - or would not - realise that they themselves wm
——* by the rearmament of Germany, by the occupation of the
Rhineland, by the unilateral abrogation of the Treaty of Locarno -
by the annexation of Austria or by the crippling of Czechoslovakia.
IOnly when it was too late did Britain and France oomej fully to
realise that German ambitions constituted a direct threat to their
own most vital Interest of all - their way of life, their tradition
of liberty and decency, their 'deathless attachment to freedom;'
when they had so reelised, they fought - but for Prance it was
too late. 199
On September IV Hugh Dal ton had warned Chamberlain of this, adding that ".
. .at
each stage you will have fewer frleada and weaker allies to support you in any
stand you may, at some late hour, decide to make."200 xn thie regard George
P. Kennan says that Munich demonstrates that It usually pays "to stand up man-
fully to one's problems," even when no certain victory is in sight. 201
"Honor" may certainly be over-streesed. And dealing with Russia in Itself
would not have been particularly "honorable." But it seems that Britain had
a large stake in what was happening on the continent of Europe, regardless of
"honor". Britain had something to lose by fighting a war; but she had more to
lose by fighting e long, uphill war. Action in 1938 might have resulted in an
early end in view of Csech military strength, anti-Hitler feeling within Ger-
many, the Reich's lack of capacity for sustaining a full-scale wer effort in-
volving two fronts, etc. War in 1939, whan the Csech army and defenses were gone,
the German military machine wes much stronger, and when Russia was on the side
of Germany, was probably going to be e much more coatly one for Great Britain.
Was war inevitable in September, 1938, and if so could this have been recog-
nized et the time? The answer to both parts of the question Is quite definitely
199. Wheeler-Bennett. J.W.. Munich. L. 7
.
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X31< Churchill thought so and said so; Dal ton and Cooper war* of the aame
opinion; even Oaladiar predicted thin in no uncertain terms. Their estimate
of appeasement's results may wall have been expressed as General Douglas
MaeArthur did la 1951:
History teaches with unmistakable emphasis that appeasement
but begets new and bloodier war. It points to no single
Instance where it has led to more than a ahem peace. Like
blackmail, it lays the basis for new and successively greater
demands until in the end, as in blackmail, violence becomes
the only other alternative. 202
(5) This leads us te the question of public opinion in Greet Britain.
Could Britain have gone to war in September, 1938, with the support of public
opinion? The answer to this question would lie in the hands of the governmental
leadership „ The government, by making its position clear to the people, by
emphasising that the British would be fighting not so much for Czechoslovakia
as for the security of the British way of life, by acting with conviction, would
probably have been followed courageously by its people, and It could have been
accomplished most easily between September 24 and 28 when public opinion - as
has bean shown - had "hardened" In favor of honor and support of the Czechs -
when, I must add, few of the people had been made aware of the fact that there
was more at stake than Czechoslovakia Itself. It may be concluded, therefore,
that public opinion would not have been a serious barrier to a change in Bri-
tish foreign policy during the Munich week.
(6) Finally, if Germany should have been stopped in 1938, how should this
have been attempted? What alternative was there to appeasement?
As early as 1937 Neville Chamberlain had been convinced that the League of
Nations was a failure, that the ideal of collective security must be abandoned.
202. MaeArthur, General Douglaa, —ttni ^ing A Nation (Chicago, II SX) s 4a .
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Chamberlain decided that tha only way to appeasement (peace) in Europe was
personal (Chamberlain) contact with the dictators. Hence, collective securi-
ty wes never considered by the Prime Minister. The formulation of power blocks,
he said, would inevitably spell war.
This may have bean true, and even LiCvlnoff , advocate of collective secur-
ity under the League, admitted that rearmament and alignment probably meant war.
But what the proponents of this viewpoint sought was to avoid a major, drawn-out
conflict.
As late as September 14, military expert 1*1ddell -Hart expressed his belief
that a firm British policy "might still line up Poland, Rumania, and others, to
our side,*' that Italy - in the face of collective Allied strength - might be
nudged into neutrality. 203 Certainly the implementation of the balance of pow-
er concept would have changed the circumstances for Hitler. A positive de-
cision by BrItsin. Prance, and Russia, along with Csechoslovakia, to stop Hitler
unless he agreed to plebiscites under Anglo-French Jurisdiction granting the
Czechs rights to removal of military and soma economic Installations, and an
agreement to have the League settle Polish and Hungarian minority disputes with
Csechoslovakia would have preserved the integrity of the West and made war lass
likely. Had war followed, Csechoslovakia almost certainly would have been over-
run; but the prospect of ultimate German victory would not have been as bright
as It was in 1939. Germany could not have successfully coped with pressure
from two sides. Furthermore, Poland and Rumania might have seen hope for West-
ern victory and acted accordingly - assuming that they were likely to hop on
the bandwagon which seemed to offer the best advantages. Russia could have
and quite likely would have provided air support. Italy was not ready for war
203. Dalton, H., 175.
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and sight wall have hacked out, whan faced with substantial resistance; Mus-
solini's confidence was the direct result of what he saw as cowardice on the
part of France and Britain.
Collective security could have been realised through the machinery of the
League of Nations. The principal reason for ita abominable failures in previous
crises is directly traceable to Britain's (and France's) reluctance to lead. A
Britain under Churchill and Sdea, for example, would have written e different
history of the 30 *s. Action through the League rather than outside it would
probably have been preferable since itsctwould have made it possible to label Ger-
many the aggressor (Article XI of the Versailles Treaty) within the technical
framework of international law.
hot only did Chamberlain not consider such a move, hut - as Cooper stated
in his resignation speech on October 3 - Britain never even declared that she
was prepared to fight until the last minute - and then uncertainly. 20* tinder
such circumstances why would Hitler not make increasingly greater and greater
demands? Why would he not make the most ef the opportunity?
Finally, appeasement might not have been an incorrect policy; it was the
correct moral course if interpreted and put Into effect realistically. Chur-
chill's words allude to such an interpretation of appeasement : "I have always
held that the maintenance of peace depends upon the accumulation of deterrents
against the aggressor, coupled with a sincere effort to redress grievances."
And Wheeler-Bennett crystallised the issue: "Appeasement - a necessary and in-
valuable card in the game of diplomacy - must be played from strength and neeet
from weakness."205
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Munich represents, as JTavighurst puts it, the end of Britain as a first-
206
class power. It also rendered inevitable the most destructive war that the
world has ever known - one from which Britain certainly did not emerge a
winner. Circumstances might have been different - victory might have been what
the term implies - had England taken the initiative during the crisis over
Czechoslovakia. The results would most certainly have been different had her
leadership been other that what it was.
Many mistakes were made well before Neville Chamberlain became Prime Mini-
ster, most important of which was the failure of the victors to establish peace
terras commeasurate with Wilsonian principles. Article 231 of Versailles, which
laid most of the guilt for World War I at the door of Germany, and the peacemakers'
failure to effect the realization of the self-determination principle certainly
facilitated Hitler's task and created tremendous problems and responsibilities
for the Prime Minister who was there when the boomerang came back - the unfortunate
Neville Chamberlain. But Chamberlain was neither realistic, nor perceptive, nor
sensitive to honor when he practiced appeasement from a position of weak-
ness, involving acquiescence to the dictator's every demand, simply because he
lacked faith in collective security.
Although it may be argued that these conclusions are drawn in retrospect,
it is no less true that there were voices in the '30's which said substantially
what I write herej their warnings may be found throughout this paper.
206. Havighurst, AJP., Twentieth Century Britain . 2?3.
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